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ABSTRACT
Based on nothing more than John Henry Wigmore’s personal belief
that a witness under the throes of excitement is unable to fabricate an
untruthful statement, the excited utterance exception allows parties to
present out-of-court statements to the jury or judge without any of the
safeguards the judicial system uses to promote honest and accurate
testimony. This Article collects and examines much of the scientific
evidence bearing on Wigmore’s premise and identifies two paradoxical
conclusions that undermine the exception. First, the premise itself is
unfounded; science absolutely does not support the notion that a witness
is incapable of lying while emotionally agitated. But, there is a second
phenomenon at work that counteracts the premise (were it valid);
witnesses under extreme emotional stress are unreliable observers and
reporters of the events causing the stress. Thus, in the unlikely event that
an occurrence was sufficiently stressful to impede the ability to lie, the
stress would also interfere with the ability to perceive and describe the
occurrence reliably. Based on this paradox, this Article concludes that the
excited utterance exception is both broken and irreparable, and therefore
recommends abandoning the excited utterance exception altogether.
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INTRODUCTION
A truck driver swerved off the road into an embankment and was
badly injured.1 A second truck driver stopped and helped pull the injured
driver from his burning truck.2 Twenty-three minutes later, the second
driver called a friend and described the incident in emotional terms,
apparently moved by the severity of the injured driver’s condition.3 When
he arrived at his house a couple of hours later, the second driver described
the same incident to his wife.4 The following morning, he described the
event to a co-worker.5 All three times, he told the same story: he was
following the injured driver’s truck, saw the accident, stopped in Good
Samaritan fashion to help, and was traumatized by the experience.
In ensuing litigation, the admissibility of these three out-of-court
statements by the second driver was challenged. The court held that the
first statement fell within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule, coming less than thirty minutes after the accident—a presumptive
time limitation for the exception.6 The court deemed the other two
statements outside the exception based on the greater passage of time.7
The consequence of an excited utterance is that it comes into
evidence without any of the safeguards the judicial system uses to promote
honest and accurate testimony such as placing the speaker under oath,
cross-examining, and observing the witness’s demeanor. The premise of
the excited utterance exception is that when a witness is sufficiently
emotional following an event, the witness will be incapable of fabricating,
and, therefore, these safeguards are unnecessary. What leads the law to
presume that extreme stress prevents a witness from lying? What leads the
law to presume that a witness so emotionally overwrought as to be
incapable of lying is a reliable observer and reporter of the event causing
1. Prescott v. R & L Transfer, Inc., 111 F.Supp.3d 650 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
2. Id. at 654.
3. Id. at 655.
4. Id. at 659.
5. Id. at 657–58.
6. Id. at 655–56.
7. Id. at 655–56.
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the emotional upheaval? What leads the law to presume that thirty minutes
is a critical, or even meaningful, period of time in this analysis?
Certainly not science. Edward Cleary, a twentieth-century evidence
scholar, wrote, “the rules of evidence largely have been constructed out of
anecdotes and unsystematic observation, plus what hopefully passes for
reason but could more honestly be labeled conjecture about human
behavior.”8 No doctrine is more heavily based on conjecture than the
excited utterance exception.
Psychological studies suggest that stressful events trigger the “flightor-flight” response, and that deceptive statements are not only possible,
they can be a natural component of the fight-or-flight response, such as
statements designed to deflect guilt or blame away from the speaker or
someone with whom the speaker is aligned. Not only are witness
statements under intense stress not immutably truthful, but psychology
also informs us that these witness statements are also inherently
inaccurate. A traumatic event dramatically increases cognitive load,
leading to perception deficits and distortions. Thus, excited witness
perceptions tend to be unreliable for many reasons.
Furthermore, when one considers these two scientific principles in
juxtaposition, one realizes that they operate in an inverse relationship that
systemically undermines the excited utterance exception. The premise of
the exception is that as the stress of an incident increases, an observer’s
ability to lie decreases. At the same time those stress levels are increasing,
however, the reliability of the declarant’s observations and
communications is also decreasing. If the stress level were to be so high
that the declarant was rendered incapable of lying, any statement the
declarant made in that condition would likely be unreliable. This paradox
eviscerates the excited utterance exception.
In Part I, this Article will start with a brief overview of the history of
the excited utterance exception. In Part II, this Article will discuss the
manner in which the courts have applied the excited utterance exception,
highlighting the inconsistency in the standards that the courts apply. Part
III will discuss some of the existing scholarship critical of the excited
utterance exception. Part IV will present some of the scientific data that
undermines the foundation of the excited utterance exception. Finally, the
Article will conclude by recommending the abolition of the excited
utterance exception.

8. See MICHAEL J. SAKS & BARBARA A. SPELLMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
EVIDENCE LAW 14 (2016) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5
VAND. L. REV. 277, 278 (1951–52)). The author is extremely grateful to Professors Saks and Spellman
for providing an advance copy of their book.
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GENESIS OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION

The United States civil litigation system places live oral testimony,
given under oath and subject to cross-examination, on a pedestal. Crossexamination is, perhaps, the most probing tool for scrutinizing witness
testimony. Justice Marshall described cross-examination as “the greatest
safeguard of American trial procedure.”9 Professor John Henry Wigmore
lavished even greater praise on cross-examination, deeming it “beyond
any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the
truth.”10
In addition to the probative value of cross-examination, other aspects
of live testimony advance the truth-seeking function of trials. Witnesses
feel pressure to tell the truth when testifying under oath, either from moral
obligation or the threat of perjury prosecution.11 Live testimony also
provides the jury or judge the opportunity to observe witness demeanor to
evaluate reliability and credibility.12 For these reasons, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure place a strong emphasis on live testimony.13
The hearsay rule seeks to protect these truth-promoting benefits of
live testimony. Wigmore found origins of the concept of hearsay in the
1500s.14 Prior to that time, jurors were supposed to bring their outside
knowledge to trials and they could properly rely on “the communications
of trustworthy neighbors” to advance the “prevailing conviction of the
community.”15 That practice contrasts sharply with today’s jurors, who are
typically cautioned to avoid any exposure to information or opinion
outside the formal proceeding, and who can be excused for cause if they
speak to anyone during the pendency of the case.16
9. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 410 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
10. See Alan G. Williams, Abolishing the Excited Utterance Exception to the Rule Against
Hearsay, 63 K.L. REV. 717, 719 n.10 (2015) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1974)).
11. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (noting that testimony under oath, “(1)
insures that the witness will give his statements under oath—thus impressing him with the seriousness
of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the
witness to submit to cross-examination, the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth’; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness
in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility”).
12. See Perotti v. Quinones, 790 F.3d 712, 723 (7th Cir. 2015).
13. See, e.g., id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 43.
14. John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437 (1904).
15. Id. at 439.
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 47; Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1955) (creating a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice for communications between a third party and a juror); Barnes v. Joyner,
751 F.3d 229, 240 (4th Cir. 2014) (“An impartial jury is one that arrives at its verdict ‘based upon the
evidence developed at trial’ and without external influences.” (citation omitted)); Fullwood v. Lee,
290 F.3d 663, 682 (4th Cir. 2002) (case remanded because juror discussed the death penalty with her
husband during the deliberations).
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Wigmore found the rule against hearsay to be firmly established by
the early 1700s.17 By the 1800s, courts were creating and regularly
applying common law exceptions to the hearsay rule.18 Under these
exceptions, out-of-court statements were admissible if they contained
sufficient indicia of reliability to outweigh the intrinsic infirmities of
hearsay.19 Such hearsay exceptions were lumped into a common law
doctrine referred to as “res gestae.”20
The res gestae exceptions embodied the concept that statements
made spontaneously during or immediately following an act were, in
essence, part of that act rather than merely a witness’s account of the act,
and therefore should be admissible to explain the act.21 Common law res
gestae included dying declarations, declarations of present sense
impressions, and declarations of present bodily conditions or mental
states.22
Professor Wigmore championed the excited utterance exception that
became part of the res gestae doctrine, although he used the phrase
“spontaneous exclamation.”23 He greatly preferred it to the present sense
impression exception because the excited utterance exception had a more
flexible temporal component.24 Wigmore’s excited utterance exception
had three criteria: (1) there must be a startling occasion; (2) the out-ofcourt statement must be made before the declarant has had time to
fabricate; and (3) the declarant’s out-of-court statement must relate to the

17. Wigmore, supra note 14, at 448 (noting that the primary justification for the exclusion of
hearsay was that “the other side hath no opportunity of a cross-examination.”).
18. Williams, supra note 10, at 720.
19. Id.
20. Literally “things done” or “the events at issue or others contemporaneous with them.” BRYAN
A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 761 (2d ed. 1995); see also MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, 7 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803:2 (7th ed., 2015).
21. Williams, supra note 10, at 721–22; William Gorman Passannante, Res Gestae, The Present
Sense Impression Exception and Extrinsic Corroboration Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) and
its State Counterparts, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89, 96 (1988/89).
22. Williams, supra note 4, at 721–22. (noting that Professor Wigmore is generally credited with
creating the excited utterance exception, which he championed over the present sense impression
exception).
23. Williams, supra note 10, at 724 n.29; Aviva Orenstein, “MY GOD!”: A Feminist Critique of
the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 169 (1997). Wigmore did
not invent the exception; indeed, he traced its roots back to Thompson v. Trevanion, a 1693 case. Id.
at 170.
24. Williams, supra note 10, at 722 n.23 (“Wigmore famously stalled judicial acceptance of the
[present sense impression] exception for decades.”) (quoting Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and
the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 336–37 (2012)) (“By and
large, the courts found Wigmore’s position persuasive. Until the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, only a few jurisdictions recognized the present sense impression.”) (quoting Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: A Relapse in
Hearsay Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. 319, 327–28 (2009)).
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circumstances of the startling event.25 Under such circumstances,
Wigmore believed, the stress of nervous excitement “stills the reflective
faculties and removes their control,” such that any statements are a
“spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions . . . .”26 In other words, Wigmore thought that a witness in the
throes of excitement following a traumatic incident would be so
incapacitated by emotion as to be unable, or at least unlikely, to lie. The
likely truthful nature of such statements, the reasoning continues, trumps
the lack of safeguards ordinarily associated with live, under oath testimony
subject to cross-examination. Accordingly, courts should admit such
statements even though they are hearsay.
In 1975, with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
common law doctrines of hearsay and res gestae became codified in
federal courts.27 Hearsay is currently defined as “a statement that: (1) the
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in
the statement.”28 Federal Rule of Evidence 803 contains twenty-three
exceptions to the hearsay rule that apply regardless of whether the
declarant is available to testify as a witness.29 Federal Rule of Evidence
804 contains five exceptions to the hearsay rule that apply only if the
declarant is unavailable to testify as a witness.30 Federal Rule of Evidence
807 contains the residual exception to the hearsay rule, allowing
introduction of hearsay testimony that does not fit within the exceptions in
Rules 803 and 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence but is sufficiently
trustworthy to warrant admission.31
The excited utterance exception is one of the Rule 803 exceptions,
available regardless of the declarant’s availability.32 It exempts from the
hearsay rule a “statement relating to a startling event or condition, made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”33
25. Id. at 726.
26. Id. at 726 n.38 (quoting 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT THE COMMON
LAW § 1747 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1976).
27. Pub. L. No. 93–595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence).
28. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
29. FED. R. EVID. 803.
30. FED. R. EVID. 804.
31. FED. R. EVID. 807 (allowing admission of a hearsay statement that: 1) has equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to those set forth in Rules 803 and 804; 2) is offered as
evidence of a material fact; 3) is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and 4) if admitted, will best serve
the purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice). The rule also requires that
the party offering evidence under Rule 807 provide adverse parties with advance notice. FED. R. EVID.
807(b).
32. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
33. Id.
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Most state rules of evidence employ identical, or nearly identical, language
for their excited utterance exceptions.34 The present sense impression
exception, the first cousin of the excited utterance exception, is also found
in Rule 803, and exempts a “statement describing or explaining an event
or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.”35
II.

THE COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE
EXCEPTION

Although the excited utterance exception as set forth in Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(2) and in many state analogs is expressed in one fairly
short sentence, the courts have not construed or applied the doctrine
consistently. Rather, the following summaries illustrate the whimsical
nature of judicial decisions applying the excited utterance exception.36
A.

Trial Court Applications of the Excited Utterance Exception

It is not difficult to find cases that illustrate the lack of consistency
in the trial courts’ application of the excited utterance exception. This
section presents a sampling of those cases, grouped by category of factors
the courts often consider in applying the exception.
1.

Passage of Time

The courts are particularly inconsistent in factoring in the passage of
time when applying the excited utterance exception. At the shorter end of
the time spectrum, consider Handel v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., in
which the declarant was caught and dragged by a train.37 When the train
stopped, he fell to the ground.38 Two witnesses heard his cries, and arrived
approximately two and one-half minutes after the train stopped.39 Both
witnesses heard the declarant state, “Save me. Help me—why did that
conductor close the door on me?”40 The trial court excluded the statement
as “narrative of a past event.”41 Similarly, in Alabama Power Co. v. Ray,
an accident victim’s statement, made just five minutes after the incident,

34. Williams, supra note 10, at 726 n.44 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8
(1992)).
35. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
36. Some of the following cases are criminal, not civil, and others are state courts applying the
state analog to FED. R. EVID. 803(2). Despite these differences, they still illustrate the problems with
the excited utterance exception.
37. 297 N.Y.S. 216, 218, 252 A.D. 142 (1937).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 217.
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was deemed inadmissible because the witness was “merely giving a
narrative of a transaction which was really and substantially past.”42
At the longer end of the time spectrum, consider State v. Duke in
which the defendant was accused of sexually molesting his three-year-old
daughter.43 One evening approximately ten days after the incident, the
daughter told her mother about the molestation.44 The following day, the
mother took her daughter to a county agency, where a social worker
interviewed the girl.45 They notified the police, who took the girl to a local
hospital, where she spoke with a nurse.46 The girl was subsequently
interviewed by a doctor at another hospital.47 The trial court held that the
mother, social worker, nurse, and doctor could all testify as to the girl’s
statements as excited utterances.48 The court held that there was no set time
period for an excited utterance, so long as the statement was made “under
the influence of the startling occurrence to such a degree that the statement
could not have been the product of reflective thought.”49
Similarly, in State ex rel. Harris v. Schmidt, the defendant was
accused of assaulting his five-year-old stepson.50 The boy told his mother
about it the next day but did not tell the defendant’s probation officer about
it until fifteen days after the assault.51 The court allowed the probation
officer to testify under the excited utterance exception.52
In between these extremes, courts often seem to use thirty minutes as
a default time period during which witnesses are unable to fabricate their
testimony.53 Prescott v. R & L Transfer, Inc., illustrates the arbitrary nature
of this default time period.54 In that case, the declarant witnessed a horrific
truck accident and helped pull the driver from the burning truck.55 After
departing the scene, he called a friend on his cell phone and described the
42. 249 Ala. 568, 571, 32 So. 2d 219, 221 (1947).
43. No. 52604, 1988 WL 88862, *1 (Ohio 1988).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *4–6.
49. Id. at *4.
50. 69 Wis.2d 668, 230 N.W.2d 890 (1975).
51. Id. at 672.
52. Id. at 684.
53. See Orenstein, supra note 23, at 182 (“The excited utterance exception, however, routinely
admits statements made thirty minutes after the exciting event.”); see also MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 30C
FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 7043 (2014) (collecting cases); Time element as affecting admissibility
of statement or complaint made by victim of sex crimes as res gestae, spontaneous exclamation, or
excited utterance, 89 A.L.R.3d 102 (originally published in 1979) (collecting cases).
54. 111 F. Supp. 3d 650, 650–63 (W.D. Pa. 2015), reconsideration denied, No. CIV.A. 3:11203, 2015 WL 5136213 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2015).
55. Id. at 654.
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events.56 There was conflicting testimony about whether this call occurred
twenty-three minutes or forty minutes after the accident.57 The court
emphasized that the call was only twenty-three minutes after the accident
significant when it admitted the friend’s testimony under the excited
utterance exception.58
Thus, courts seem to use thirty minutes as a presumptive limit for
excited utterances but have deemed hearsay statements made as little as
two and one-half minutes after an event to be inadmissible as outside the
influence of the event and statements made fifteen days after the incident
to be admissible as excited utterances. Of course, none of these time
periods has any scientific support.
2.

Nature of the Event

Courts are also inconsistent regarding the nature of the event that can
support an excited utterance. For example, courts often require a
“startling” event as the predicate for an excited utterance,59 but just how
startling must an event be to “still the reflective faculties”60 such that the
declarant is incapable of lying?
Criminal cases often involve hearsay statements by the victim of the
crime. Likewise, tort cases may involve hearsay statements by the person
injured by the tort. Presumably, being seriously injured in an incident
presents a relatively strong case for the application of the excited utterance
exception. Sometimes, though, courts apply the excited utterance
exception to statements made after far less impactful events.
For example, in American Craft Hosiery Corp. v. Damascus Hosiery
Mills, Inc., the court applied the excited utterance exception to a
declarant’s statements made after a business meeting in which the
declarant was told he could not proceed with a proposed contract.61 In U.S.
v. Vazquez, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the
declarant’s statement after learning that a co-defendant denied knowing
the declarant (allegedly causing the declarant to fear that he would receive
all the blame for the incident in question) was under the stress of
excitement and thus within the excited utterance exception.62

56. Id.
57. Id. at 656.
58. Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir.1998) for the proposition that
a forty-minute time span might be too long, while a fifteen to twenty-minute time span was not too
long).
59. See the tests from the various courts of appeal described in the following section.
60. Williams, supra note 10, at 738 n.93.
61. 575 F. Supp. 816 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
62. 857 F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1988).
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In U.S. v. Bailey, the declarant was a juror who a criminal defendant
attempted to bribe.63 The trial court deemed the attempted bribe a “startling
event” eligible for the excited utterance exception.64 In U.S. v. Lawrence,
the defendant allegedly robbed the declarant.65 When the police arrested
the defendant, they asked the declarant to identify the defendant, who was
handcuffed and lying on the ground.66 The prosecutor then called the
police officer to testify as to what the declarant had said.67 The court found
the confrontation with the man who had allegedly just robbed him to
support the excited utterance exception, even though the robber was
constrained and posed no threat.68
In U.S. v. Napier, the defendant allegedly kidnapped and physically
assaulted the declarant.69 The declarant was hospitalized for seven weeks
following the assault and underwent two brain operations.70
Approximately one week after the declarant returned home, her sister
showed the declarant a newspaper article with a photograph of the
defendant.71 The sister was permitted to testify that the declarant’s reaction
was “great distress and horror and upset,” and that she pointed to it and
said, “He killed me, he killed me.”72 The defendant argued that the eightweek lapse since the assault removed the case from the excited utterance
exception, but the court held that the startling event was seeing the picture
and allowed the testimony.73
Finally, in David by Berkeley v. Pueblo Supermarket of St. Thomas,
the declarant saw the plaintiff’s mother, a pregnant woman, slip and fall
on her stomach in a grocery store.74 The plaintiff’s father testified that he
heard the declarant state shortly after the fall, “I told them to clean it up
about two hours ago—an hour and a half ago.”75 The court held that
witnessing a pregnant woman fall on her stomach was sufficiently startling
to prevent the declarant from fabricating her statement.76
As with the passage of time after the event, there is no scientific
evidence supporting these decisions—and hundreds or thousands of
63. 834 F.2d 218 (1st Cir. 1987).
64. Id. at 228.
65. 699 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1983).
66. Id. at 699–700.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 703–04.
69. 518 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1975).
70. Id. at 317.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 318.
74. 740 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1984).
75. Id. at 234.
76. Id. at 234–35.
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others—deeming certain events sufficiently startling to render the
declarant incapable of lying. The courts and treatises certainly do not cite
studies suggesting that a declarant is incapable of lying after seeing a
photograph of her assailant eight weeks after an assault. Or that attending
a meeting where the declarant learns he will not be awarded a contract will
render the declarant unable to fabricate.
3.

Declarant’s State of Mind or Demeanor

As with the passage of time after and the nature of the startling event,
the courts are inconsistent about the evidence regarding the declarant’s
state of mind required to bring a statement within the excited utterance
exception. Judicial opinions reflect inconsistencies from one court to the
next, inconsistencies within single opinions from one statement to another,
and inconsistencies regarding the fundamental purpose of the exception.
For example, in United States v. Tocco, the declarant was allegedly
an accomplice to an act of arson.77 The witness heard the declarant’s
statement three hours after the arson, and described the declarant as “all
hyped” and “nervous.”78 The court concluded that the declarant’s
excitement had not yet subsided when he made his statement, and
therefore it constituted an excited utterance.79
Contrast Tocco with Katona v. Fed. Exp. Corp., in which the
declarant was in a car accident and subsequently made statements about
the accident to a companion at a restaurant about an hour after the accident
and to his wife five and a half hours after the accident.80 Although the
declarant “appeared nervous and upset” at the time of his statements, the
judge concluded that the passage of time, plus the fact that the declarant
was able to drive away from the accident without calling for medical
assistance, placed his statements outside the excited utterance exception.81
In both cases, the declarant exhibited the same nervous and agitated
state and the statements were a few hours after the incident. Yet, the courts
reached the opposite conclusions. In reaching these conclusions, neither
judge appeared to consider whether appearing nervous and agitated when
making a statement—several hours after an incident—could just as easily
be symptoms of lying about the incident as they could be indicators of
telling the truth.

77. 135 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 1998).
78. Id. at 128.
79. Id.
80. No. 95 Civ. 10951(JFK), 1998 WL 126059 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1998).
81. Id. at *4.
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People v. Seymour provides an example of a court’s internal
inconsistency within a single case.82 Two housing officers found the
seventy-nine-year-old declarant lying face down in his apartment, hands
tied behind his back and head bound with gauze to a table.83 The declarant
had been robbed and confined forty-eight hours earlier, and he had
suffered a heart attack in the interim.84 The declarant had lost his larynx to
cancer eighteen years earlier and was unable to speak clearly without a
voice box.85 When he arrived at the hospital, an hour and twenty minutes
after being discovered, he was able to communicate to hospital staff that
someone he knew who lived on the fourth floor of his building had
committed the crimes.86 Twenty minutes later, a police officer arrived with
the declarant’s voice box.87 Using the voice box, the declarant identified
his assailant and provided additional details about the events.88 The
declarant died from his injuries a few months after the burglary, and the
prosecutor offered witnesses to testify as to the declarant’s statements.89
The trial court admitted testimony regarding both statements under the
excited utterance exception, but the appellate court reversed the trial
court’s decision, holding that only the first statement was an excited
utterance, and that the trial court’s admission of the second statement was
reversible error.90 Because the declarant was actively receiving treatment
at the time of the first statement, the court reasoned, he was too distracted
to fabricate.91 By twenty minutes later, however, this elderly declarant had
sufficiently recovered from his confinement and heart attack such that his
statements about his assailant were no longer spontaneous.92
Similarly, in Coyle v. Kristjan Palusalu Maritime Co., Ltd., the
declarant was a deceased stevedoring contractor who had tripped over a
wire and sustained injuries.93 In ruling on a hearsay objection to testimony
by someone who heard the declarant’s statements after his fall, the court
found one of his statements subject to the excited utterance exception and
the other contemporaneous statement not covered.94 The court found that
the declarant was “startled” by the incident, thus bringing his statement
82. 588 N.Y.S.2d 551, 551 (1992).
83. Id. at 552.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 551–52.
90. Id. at 553–55.
91. Id. at 554–55.
92. Id. at 552.
93. 83 F.Supp.2d 535 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
94. Id. at 542–43.
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“clearly” within the exception, because he had sustained a nosebleed from
the fall,95 and because his nose was still bleeding, it demonstrated that he
had not had sufficient time to reflect and fabricate.96 The court found his
statement describing the incident to be admissible, but his simultaneous
statement about the crew having replaced the wire recently to be outside
the exception.97
United States v. Davis may provide the best illustration of the
disconnect between the various courts’ application of the excited utterance
exception and the premise underlying the doctrine.98 In Davis, the
declarant, a teenage babysitter, saw a man with a gun driving a car and
was scared because she believed the man had committed a recent murder.99
She called 911 almost immediately and reported the incident, giving the
license plate and make of the car to the 911 operator.100 She also told the
operator that the man had two guns but later admitted that she had
exaggerated that detail in order to prompt the police to respond more
quickly—in actuality, she only saw one gun.101 The judge allowed
testimony regarding the 911 call, ruling that the declarant’s statements met
all the elements of the excited utterance exception, and that her
exaggerations went to weight, not admissibility.102
Consider the questionable logic of this result. The justification for
the excited utterance exception is that, if the declarant is still emotionally
charged after a startling event, the declarant will not be able to think clearly
enough to fabricate a statement. Here, the declarant admitted that she had
altered her statement in order to achieve a result—a quick response by the
police. Obviously, then, the fundamental premise underlying the
exception—that the witness’s emotional state would prevent her from
fabricating—did not apply to this declarant’s statement. Yet, the judge
admitted the testimony.
Furthermore, not only was the judge’s legal ruling inconsistent with
the premise of the excited utterance exception, the facts undermine the
core precept of the exception. The declarant made her statement thirty
seconds to one minute after an event the court deemed startling, but rather
than being incapable of fabrication, the declarant was admittedly able to

95. Id. at 542 (holding the presence of blood rendered the incident sufficiently startling to support
the exception).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 577 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2009).
99. Id. at 664.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 669–70.
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exaggerate the circumstances for a calculated objective.103 This
remarkable teenage babysitter was apparently able to accomplish
something that Wigmore believed impossible—she was able to think
quickly enough to distort her description of a startling event in order to
advance a personal interest while still in the excitement of the incident.
While Wigmore might have been surprised by the facts of Davis, no
psychologist would be. As explained below, there is no scientific support
for the notion that nervousness, excitement, agitation, anxiety, or any of
the other conditions that courts cite as supporting the excited utterance
exception are more likely to be associated with truthfulness than with
fabrication, exaggeration, or inaccuracy.
B.

Approaches in the United States Courts of Appeal

As the trial courts struggle to apply the excited utterance exception
intelligently and consistently, they are frequently applying tests crafted by
the appellate courts. According to an analysis by Professor Matthew
Janssen, the United States Courts of Appeal have developed seven distinct
approaches to the excited utterance exception.104 Most of these tests entail
lists of elements for assessing the applicability of the exception. The First,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits apply a three-factor test that turns on whether:
“1) a startling event or condition occurred; 2) the statement was made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event
or condition; and 3) the statement relates to the startling event or
condition.”105 The Sixth Circuit employs a different three-factor test that
admits hearsay statements when: (1) there is a startling event; (2) the
declarant makes the statement before there is time to fabricate; and (3) the
statement is made under the stress of the event’s excitement.106
The Eighth Circuit expands the number of factors to six when
considering whether a hearsay statement was an excited utterance: (1) the
amount of time between the startling event and the statement; (2) whether
the statement was the product of an inquiry; (3) the declarant’s age; (4) the
declarant’s physical and mental condition; (5) the event’s characteristics;
and (6) the statement’s subject matter.107 The Fourth Circuit applies a twopronged test that also pulls in many of the Eighth Circuit’s factors. The
Fourth Circuit requires: (1) the declarant to experience a startling event or
condition, and (2) the declarant to react from the stress caused by the event
103. Id. at 664.
104. Matthew D. Janssen, The Butler Did It!!!: A Critical Analysis of the Excited Utterance
Exception to the Hearsay Rule as Applied in the Third Circuit, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (2002).
105. Id. at 1124–25 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 1128–29 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 1126–27 (citations omitted).
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and not from reflection or fabrication, using five of the Eighth Circuit’s
factors to make this determination.108
The Third Circuit has its own four-factor approach. It requires: “(1)
a startling occasion, (2) a statement relating to the circumstances of the
startling occasion, (3) a declarant who appears to have had opportunity to
observe personally the events, and (4) a statement made before there has
been time to reflect and fabricate.”109
Two circuits have tests that do not contain elements or factors. The
Fifth Circuit asks “whether the statements were the product of reflective
thought or whether they were the result of the startling event.”110 The
Second Circuit “simply tries to determine whether the declarant was still
under the excitement caused by the startling event.”111
These seven approaches—with zero, two, three, four, or six factors—
reflect the murky subjectivity in the excited utterance exception. Yet, there
are some common themes. The courts know that every statement following
an incident is not automatically trustworthy. They accept the notion that a
declarant in a sufficient state of excitement or emotional arousal from
witnessing or experiencing a “startling” event should be considered
trustworthy. They vest the trial judge with the discretion to assess whether
the declarant made the hearsay statement in question under temporal and
emotional circumstances rendering fabrication or distortion unlikely. Most
importantly, though, they provide virtually no scientific guidance for the
trial judge to exercise this discretion.
C.

Consideration by the United States Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court has discussed the excited utterance
exception in F.R.E. 803(2) at least five times.112 In none of these cases was
the Court actually adjudicating a lower court’s evidentiary ruling applying
the excited utterance exception. Rather, the cases were all criminal cases,
typically appealed on the basis of alleged violations of the Confrontation
Clause, with the Court’s discussion of the excited utterance exception
appearing in dicta.

108. Id. at 1129 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 1130 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 1126 (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 1129 (citations omitted).
112. The five cases are Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014); Michigan v. Bryant, 562
U.S. 344 (2011); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990);
and Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). The Supreme Court has only referenced the phrase “excited
utterance” in thirty-three reported cases, most of them in the 1800s. In addition to the five cases
referenced in this section, the Court referred to the excited utterance exception a handful of times after
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, but only in passing.
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Uniformly, the Court discussed the excited utterance exception in
language that accepted both the exception itself and the reasoning
underlying the exception. The Court generally repeated, without any
probing analysis, Wigmore’s proposition that declarants are unable to
fabricate or distort testimony when in a state of excitement. Likewise, the
Court did not probe the lower court’s application of the exception with any
meaningful scrutiny.
For example, in White v. Illinois, the defendant was accused of
sexually assaulting a four-year-old girl.113 The girl’s babysitter was
awakened by the girl’s screams and saw the defendant leave the girl’s
room.114 The babysitter spoke to the girl immediately, and the girl
described inappropriate touching.115 The girl’s mother returned home
about thirty minutes later, and the girl repeated her story.116 The mother
called the police, who arrived about forty-five minutes after the incident,
and the girl, once again, repeated her story.117 Approximately four hours
after the incident, the girl was taken to the emergency room, where she
repeated the story to a nurse and doctor.118 Over the defendant’s hearsay
objection, the babysitter, mother, investigating officer, nurse, and doctor
were all permitted to testify as to the girl’s out-of-court statements.119
Although the appeal centered around the Confrontation Clause, the
Court discussed the hearsay implications of these out-of-court
statements.120 The Court opined that, not only were the hearsay statements
sufficiently trustworthy to warrant admission, they were more likely
reliable than live, in-court, after-the-fact testimony.121 The Court wrote
that the statements should carry more weight because they were offered
“in a moment of excitement—without the opportunity to reflect on the
consequences.”122 Similarly, a statement “made in the course of procuring
medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may
cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of
credibility.”123 The Court did not discuss, or even recognize, any
uncertainty about whether the statements of a four-year-old child
warranted the same deference that the hearsay exceptions accord to
statements of adults. Similarly, the Court did not discuss whether the time
113. 502 U.S. 346, 349 (1992).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 349–50.
118. Id. at 350.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 347.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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difference of the various statements—ranging from essentially
contemporaneous with the event to four hours following—was material to
its analysis.
The Court’s language in these cases suggests that the Court embraces
Wigmore’s belief that excited utterances are inherently trustworthy. In
Idaho v. Wright, the Court expressed its view that excited utterances are
sufficiently reliable so as to render cross-examination “superfluous.” 124 In
Michigan v. Bryant, the Court stated that excited utterances are
“considered reliable because the declarant, in the excitement, presumably
cannot form a falsehood.” 125 The Court also quoted language from
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence: “The basis for the ‘excited utterance’
exception . . . is that such statements are given under circumstances that
eliminate
the
possibility
of
fabrication,
coaching,
or
confabulation . . . .”126 Thus, the Court seemed to endorse the idea that,
not only is it less likely that a declarant would lie while still in an excited
state, it is impossible.
Only in Navarette v. California, did the Court seem to question the
broad application of the excited utterance exception. 127 The Court wrote,
“It is the immediacy that gives the statement some credibility; the
declarant has not had time to dissemble or embellish.”128 The Court
reasoned that a declarant who had time to observe the license number of
the offending vehicle, bring her car to a halt, copy down the license
number, and call the police had “[p]lenty of time to dissemble or
embellish.”129
D.

Scientific Guidance for Judges

One explanation for why the courts are so inconsistent in their
application of the excited utterance exception is that there are no rigorous
science-based explanatory materials available for judges. Judges are given
broad discretion to implement the doctrine, but not supplied with any
evidence-based basis for exercising that discretion.
The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 803(2) certainly are not much
help. The original 1975 notes explain the exception: “The theory of
Exception (2) is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of
excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces
utterances free of conscious fabrication.”130 This explanation is followed
124. 497 U.S. at 820 (1990).
125. 562 U.S. at 361 (2011) (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 362 (emphasis added).
127. 134 S. Ct. at 1683–96 (2014).
128. Id. at 1694.
129. Id.
130. FED. R. EVID. 802(2) advisory comm. notes.
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by a brief discussion of whether the statement itself may be the only proof
of the startling event or whether additional evidence is required, and
concludes that the statement alone may be sufficient. And that is it.131
Many judges use Federal Courtroom Evidence132 as their desk
reference for evidence issues. Although much more detailed and
substantive than the Advisory Committee notes, Federal Courtroom
Evidence does not provide meaningful guidance on the application of the
excited utterance exception either.
Federal Courtroom Evidence contains three subsections discussing
the excited utterance exception.133 The first subsection is titled “Startling
Event or Condition.”134 Regarding the nature of the event that qualifies for
the exception, this subsection provides the following helpful instruction:
“In addition to deciding whether the event took place, the judge must
determine whether it was startling.”135 The only illumination that the
manual provides regarding how the judge should decide whether an event
was sufficiently startling is that the “presence of blood from an accident
or assault seems to lead to an automatic conclusion of excitement.”136 In
the absence of blood, applicability of the excited utterance exception
depends on “the court’s assessment of the shock value of the event in
question on the declarant.”137
The second subsection is titled “Personal Perception,” and it
discusses the requirement that the declarant have personally observed the
startling event.138 The final subsection is titled “Under the Stress of
Excitement.”139 It instructs judges that, “[f]or this exception to apply, the
court must be able to find that the declarant’s state of mind at the time of
making the declaration ruled out the conscious reflection essential for
fabrication.”140 It explains that the rule “does not require that the
declarant be completely incapable of deliberative thought at the time
he or she made the statement.”141 Rather, “[a]ll that the exception

131. Rule 803 was amended in 1987, 1997, 2000, 2011, and 2014, but none of the amendments
affected the substance of Rule 803(2) and none of the Advisory Committee Notes mention Rule
803(2).
132. JOSEPH W. COTCHETT, FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter
FEDERAL COURTROOM EVIDENCE].
133. Id. §§ 803.3.1– 803.3.3.
134. Id. § 803.3.1.
135. Id. (emphasis in original).
136. Id. (emphasis in original).
137. Id. (emphasis in original).
138. Id. § 803.3.2.
139. Id. § 803.3.3.
140. Id. (emphasis in original).
141. Id. (emphasis in original).
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requires is that the statement be made contemporaneously with the
excitement resulting from the event.”142
Regarding the time period over which “the excitement from the
event” persists, the manual is similarly unhelpful. It notes that, “[n]o
particular period of elapsed time is decisive. The crucial point is that the
court must be able to find that the declarant’s state at the time of making
the statement ruled out the possibility of fabrication.”143 The only
nuance the manual provides is that, “[p]hysical factors, such as shock,
unconsciousness, or pain, may prolong the period in which the risk of
fabrication is reduced to an acceptable minimum.”144
This discussion of Federal Courtroom Evidence’s treatment of the
excited utterance exception is not an indictment of the manual. Rather, the
entire legal system largely ignores the scientific data regarding people’s
tendencies and abilities to perceive and fabricate in the minutes, hours, or
days following a startling event. Judges are left to make these assessments
based on their intuition.
III.

SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE
EXCEPTION

The excited utterance exception has not escaped criticism from
scholars. Indeed, criticism of the excited utterance exception is not new.
In 1928, Yale’s Dean Hutchins and Dr. Slesinger wrote, “On psychology
grounds, the rule might very well read: Hearsay is inadmissible, especially
(not except) if it be a spontaneous exclamation.”145 They based this
opinion in part on their recognition of the perception problems of excited
declarants.146
Numerous scholars since have criticized the excited utterance
exception as inconsistent with what psychologists believe to be the human
capacity to fabricate while under emotional stress. Aviva Orenstein
included a section in her article on the excited utterance exception titled,
“The Psychological Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception,” in
which she noted that the time to lie is measured in seconds, not the thirty
minutes that courts often use as a default window.147Angela Conti and

142. Id. (emphasis in original).
143. Id. (emphasis in original).
144. Id. (emphasis in original).
145. Donald Slesinger & Robert M. Hutchins, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 432, 439 (1928). This article has been frequently quoted or cited, including in the
Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 803(2).
146. Id. at 438.
147. Orenstein, supra note 23, at 178.
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Brian Gitnik criticized the excited utterance exception in 1999 as contrary
to psychological beliefs.148
A number of other scholars recommend abolishing the excited
utterance exception. For example, James Donald Moorehead wrote in
1995 that all of the res gestae exceptions should be abolished because such
statements are not sufficiently reliable to forego cross-examination in open
court.149 Alan Williams reached the same conclusion based on both the
courts’ struggles to apply the exception consistently and on the science
suggesting that lies are frequently spontaneous.150
In none of these articles, however, did the authors dig deeply into the
scientific evidence. Instead, most provide a relatively high-level
conclusion that science does not support the exception. Michael Saks and
Barbara Spellman, two law professors with psychology degrees, took a
deep dive into the science behind many rules of evidence in their excellent
recent book, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law.151
Although the excited utterance exception occupies only a small portion of
their book, the authors recognize both the doubtful nature of Wigmore’s
presumption that startled declarants cannot fabricate and the impairment
on perception that startling events can cause.152 They conclude that excited
utterances are “not as reliable as the law thinks.”153
IV.

SCIENCE VS. THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION

In light of the courts’ inconsistent application of the excited utterance
exception and the paucity of legal scholarship collecting and describing
the relevant science, this Section will attempt to describe in some detail
the physiology and psychology of human reaction to startling events.
The primary assumption underlying the excited utterance exception
is that a person’s spontaneous statement about a “startling event” made
while in the state of excitement prompted by those events is so trustworthy
that we can forego the safeguards attendant with live testimony designed
to detect dishonesty or misperception. From a more scientific point of
view, this seemingly simple assumption rests on three main hypotheses:
1. A startling event reliably produces a state of excitement;
148. Angela Conti & Brian Gitnik, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2): Problems with the Excited
Utterance Exception to the Rule on Hearsay, 14 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 227, 247 (1999)
(“The idea that stress stills the reflective capacities and enables the declarant’s statement to be truthful
is also disputed by many psychologists.”).
149. James Donald Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: the Fallacy of Res Gestae
Reliability, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 203, 203 (1995).
150. Williams, supra note 10, at 738 (quoting Judge Posner).
151. See generally Saks, supra note 8.
152. Id. at 196.
153. Id.
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2. That state of excitement interferes with the individual’s ability to
deceive; and
3. That state of excitement simultaneously neither distorts the
individual’s perception of the startling event nor impairs the individual’s
ability to organize the resulting perceptions into congruent and coherent
spontaneous statements.
This Section will examine whether the scientific literature supports
these three key hypotheses. Specifically, it will apply scientific knowledge
about the “fight-or-flight response” to the excited utterance theory, first
giving an overview of how humans respond physiologically and
psychologically to startling events. Next, it will focus more precisely on
the science about how those reactions affect an individual’s inclination or
ability to lie. Finally, it will describe how the fight-or-flight response
affects perception of startling events and the ability to use language
effectively to convey those perceptions while in a state of excitement. As
this Section demonstrates, reactions to startling events are immensely
complex and variable, and are not susceptible to simple generalizations or
lists of factors.
A.

A State of Excitement: The Fight-or-Flight Response

For more than a century, science has generally supported Wigmore’s
first hypothesis—that people do typically respond to startling events with
a “state of excitement.” The “fight-or-flight response,” as the American
physiologist Walter B. Cannon first named this state of excitement in
1915, describes the changes that occur in the nervous system and body in
the event of a perceived threat to safety or survival.154 Cannon and
contemporary scientists observed a predictable pattern of bodily responses
that occurred rapidly, powerfully, and automatically in both humans and
other animals in response to perceived threats.155 Because of the near
universality of this chain of reactions even across species and because of
their obvious protective value, the scientists concluded that this fight-orflight response is likely inborn.156 They discovered that a cascade of
responses is triggered first in the nervous system and then spread by the
hormone system, with the purpose of optimizing an organism’s ability to
take immediate protective or defensive action.157 These physiological
changes have been extensively studied in the intervening decades and the
findings are summarized below. This discussion will provide helpful
154. See generally WALTER B. CANNON, BODILY CHANGES IN PAIN, HUNGER, FEAR AND RAGE:
AN ACCOUNT OF RECENT RESEARCHES INTO THE FUNCTION OF EMOTIONAL EXCITEMENT (1915).
155. Id. at 184–88.
156. See id. at 188–94.
157. Id.
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background for understanding the more targeted science on deception and
perception while in a state of excitement.
1.

The Physiology of the Fight-or-Flight Response

Human beings, like other organisms, gather information about their
environment through their sensory organs, like eyes, ears, and skin, and
send the information over nerve pathways to the brain for processing.158
Stimuli suggestive of a threat get special treatment: they are routed to the
amygdala, a primitive structure deep in the brain that helps detect danger
and process emotion.159 The stimuli are also simultaneously sent to the
neocortex, the thinking part of the brain, but the neocortex engages in more
complex, and thus slower, processing—not ideal when emergency action
might be required.160
If the amygdala processes the stimuli as posing real and imminent
danger, it alerts the hypothalamus, which then transmits messages using
the sympathetic nervous system, including the pituitary and adrenal
glands.161 The sympathetic nervous system triggers the release of
adrenaline (also known as epinephrine) and other hormones.162 These
alarm hormones affect multiple organ systems, spurring changes from
normal “at rest” bodily functioning to enable quick and powerful
protective action.163 For example, under the influence of adrenaline, heart
rate increases dramatically, blood pressure shoots up, and the small
airways in the lungs expand while breathing also becomes more rapid;
these shifts speed delivery of blood, oxygen, and fuel to the large
muscles.164 Storage areas in the body, like the liver and pancreas,
simultaneously dump fats and sugars into the blood stream in order to
provide an energy boost for maximal physical effort.165 The body’s
cooling system adjusts to support the expected physical demands, leading
to increased sweating and raising the hairs on the skin.166 Diversion of
158. PETER H. RAVEN & GEORGE B. JOHNSON, BIOLOGY 1103–06 (6th ed. 2002).
159. GEORGE S. EVERLY JR. & JEFFREY M. LATING, A CLINICAL GUIDE TO THE TREATMENT OF
THE HUMAN STRESS RESPONSE 33–34 (3d ed. 2013).
160. Thierry Steimer, The Biology of Fear- and Anxiety-Related Behaviors, 4 DIALOGUES
CLINIQUES DE NEUROSCIENCES 231, 238 (2002). But note that although distinct areas of the brain have
been associated with certain emotional responses and types of cognition, in reality, neurological
processing is complex and different areas of the brain tend to work more in concert in a systems model.
See, e.g., Everly, supra note 159, at 24–27.
161. Everly, supra note 159, at 33–39.
162. See generally J. Wortsman, Role of Epinephrine in Acute Stress, 31 ENDOCRINOLOGY &
METABOLIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 79 (2002).
163. Id.
164. KEVIN T. PATTON & GARY A. THIBODEAU, ANATOMY AND PHYSIOLOGY 512–16 (9th ed.
2015) (see especially Tables 22-4 and 22-5).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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blood from the skin toward the muscles may cause blanching, flushing, or
both, alternating.167 At the same time, normal bodily processes
unnecessary for dealing with an emergency come to a halt: hormones
inhibit sexual response and stop digestive processes from salivation on.168
Blood clotting also increases to reduce blood loss in the event of injury.169
At the same time, hormones cause changes in the sensory systems.
Vision is altered; pupils dilate to let in more light and improve visual
capacity.170 If the threat is ambiguous or the location of safety unclear,
peripheral vision and scanning increase; however, if there is a clearly
identified threat, “tunnel vision” typically occurs, allowing intense focus
on the specific danger.171 Hearing is also affected, leading to either
hyperawareness of sounds or a serious blunting of hearing, likely related
to a quick judgment about whether the sounds are providing useful
information or serving as a dangerous distraction.172 The release of the
body’s natural opioids also reduces awareness of physical pain to help the
individual cope with possible injury.173
Once the threat is resolved, or if additional cognitive processing
overrules the amygdala’s initial determination and decides the threat is not
serious, the body’s brakes—the parasympathetic nervous system—return
the body to its normal homeostatic state, though more gradually than the
emergency system was activated.174 On the other hand, if the threat
remains ongoing, another branch of the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal
axis will stimulate release of additional hormones, which act to keep the
body’s “gas pedal” pressed down, maintaining bodily readiness to react
with violent physical activity but without the full-alert readiness of the
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Daniel Preckel & Roland von Känela, Regulation of Hemostasis by the Sympathetic
Nervous System: Any Contribution to Coronary Artery Disease?, 4 HEARTDRUG 123, 123–30 (2004).
170. Margaret M. Bradley et al., The Pupil as a Measure of Emotional Arousal and Autonomic
Activation, 45 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 602, 602–07 (2008).
171. This tunnel vision phenomenon is so common that there is a whole body of research on
“weapon focus” in which witnesses’ attention is so captivated by a gun, for example, that they are
unable to recall other readily visible details. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, et al., Some Facts About
“Weapon Focus,” 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 55–62 (1987); Jonathan M. Fawcett, et al., Of Guns and
Geese: A Meta-Analytic Review of the ‘Weapon Focus’ Literature, 19 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 35, 35–
66 (2013).
172. Christine E. Graham et al., The Cochlear CRF Signaling Systems and Their Mechanisms of
Action in Modulating Cochlear Sensitivity and Protection Against Trauma, 44 MOLECULAR
NEUROBIOLOGY 383, 383–406 (2011).
173. Z. Amit & Z.H. Galina, Stress-Induced Analgesia: Adaptive Pain Suppression, 66 PHYSIOL.
REV. 1091, 1091–120 (1986) (concluding that the functional advantage of pain reduction during
stressful situations is significant because it allows for animals to react in threatening situations as if
there were no pain).
174. See Laurie Kelly McCorry, Physiology of the Autonomic Nervous System, 71 AM. J. PHARM.
EDUC. 78 (2007).
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initial response, allowing partial return to normal physiological
functioning.175 Finally, although the general pattern of physiological
response is fairly predictable, the degree of response varies with the
perceived nature of the threat, as well as with characteristics of the
individual experiencing it, affecting the level of arousal and how long it
persists.176
What Constitutes a Threat
Because the fight-or-flight response is an inborn protection system,
many of the types of stimuli that trigger it are preprogrammed and present
from birth; these include threats that carried significant risk of bodily harm
or death in the environments that humans evolved in.177 Human ancestors
who could recognize them quickly and mobilize their resources to confront
them gained an evolutionary advantage.178 These primitive cues include
things that warn about the proximity of predators (including unfriendly
humans), dangerous environmental conditions (e.g., storms, avalanches,
and other natural disasters), dangerous situations (with risks of falling,
drowning, being burned, etc.), and indications that harm has already
occurred—and more may be coming—such as sudden pain, the
appearance of blood or internal bodily tissue, or damage to limbs.179
The stimuli include ones that are very specific, like the sight, smell,
or sound of dangerous animals, as well as others that are more generic,
such as loud noises or bright flashing lights.180 Though not all stimuli that
trigger the fight-or-flight response involve an element of surprise, ones
that involve elements of being abrupt, unexpected, and unfamiliar will
trigger the response both more reliably and more strongly.181
Characteristics that increase ambiguity or uncertainty, like darkness or
fog, and movement or other changes, also amplify the effect of the trigger
stimulus.182
Direct threats to the individual evoke the fight-or-flight response, of
course, but so do threats to one’s offspring because of the biological urge

175. See generally HANS SELYE, THE STRESS OF LIFE (New York: McGraw-Hill rev. ed. 1976).
176. See, e.g., Rachel Yehuda & Joseph LeDoux, Response Variation Following Trauma: A
Translational Neuroscience Approach to Understanding PTSD, 56 NEURON REV. 19 (2007).
177. ISAAC MARKS, FEARS, PHOBIAS, AND RITUALS: PANIC, ANXIETY, AND THEIR DISORDERS
25–52 (1987).
178. Randolph M. Nesse et al., Evolutionary Origins and Functions of the Stress Response, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STRESS 965, 965–66 (2d ed. 2007).
179. MARKS, supra note 177, at 25–52.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 35.
182. See id. at 27–28, 34–35; Dean Mobbs et al., The Ecology of Human Fear: Survival
Optimization and The Nervous System, FRONTIERS IN NEUROSCIENCE, Mar. 18, 2015, at 15.
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to preserve one’s genes.183 Because humans rely on each other for safety,
being isolated, threatened with loss of important relationships or group
membership, or being denied access to essential resources like food, water
and shelter, can evoke the fight-or-flight response as reliably as direct
physical threats.184 Situations that pose even less direct threats can also
stimulate the response, such as threats to pride and self-esteem or to
hierarchical status, because of their ultimate implications for increasing
risk of bodily harm or death.185
Modern humans generally retain these hardwired stimuli as primary
fight-or-flight triggers and acquire additional ones through experience and
learning. Many of these stimuli are near universally recognized—the sight
of a gun in the hands of a fellow subway passenger may trigger the same
strong fear of imminent death that a saber tooth tiger behind the next tree
did for a caveman.186 Other stimuli may affect a narrower group, like gang
members learning that a certain color of clothing indicates danger.187 Note
that many of the modern threats that evoke the fight-or-flight response
pose psychosocial threats rather than physical ones, yet humans’
physiology remains wired for confronting primarily physical dangers.188
2.

The Psychology of The Fight-or-Flight Response

In conjunction with the physiological changes described above, the
fight-or-flight response also initiates changes in psychosocial functioning,
including emotion, attention and memory, perception, cognition, and
behavior. Understanding these psychological effects of the fight-or-flight
response is important background for evaluating the scientific evidence
more specifically related to the validity of the excited utterance exception.

183. See Shelley E. Taylor et al., Biobehavioral Responses to Stress in Females: Tend-andBefriend, Not Fight-or-Flight, 107 PSYCHOL. REV. 411, 413–17 (2000).
184. Jennifer R. Spoor & Kipling D. Williams, The Evolution of an Ostracism-Detection System
in EVOLUTION AND THE SOCIAL MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 181–
82 (Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 2007); see also Saul L. Miller & Jon K. Manner, Coping with Romantic
Betrayal: Sex Differences in Responses to Partner Infidelity, 6 EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 413, 413–
26 (2008) (concluding males are more likely to respond to threats to primary romantic relationships
with “fight” behaviors and females with affiliative behaviors).
185. Ethel S. Person, Introduction, in RAGE, POWER, AND AGGRESSION 3 (Robert Glick &
Steven Roose eds., 1993).
186. See Elaine Fox, et al., The Detection of Fear-Relevant Stimuli: Are Guns Noticed as Quickly
as Snakes?, 7 EMOTION 691, 691–96 (2007).
187. ELLEN E. PASTORINO & SUSANN M. DOYLE-PORTILLO, WHAT IS PSYCHOLOGY?
ESSENTIALS 378 (2d ed. 2012).
188. See generally Nesse, supra note 178, at 969–70.
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Emotion

The fear system is the primary emotional system associated with the
fight-or-flight response, occurring in response to a serious threat.189 Anger
and aggression can be another part of the fight-or-flight response, either
on its own or in conjunction with fear.190 Some individuals, particularly
those who feel cornered or without adequate escape or attack resources,
may go “numb” or feel emotionally blunted instead.191
Though some people are able to regulate their emotional responses
in fight-or-flight situations, primarily by reappraising the situation as not
threatening or by deliberately suppressing at least outward emotion during
the event,192 most individuals automatically experience the emotional
responses that accompany the fight-or-flight response.193 They feel unable
to shift or even moderate their emotions during immediate and strong
threats.194 The degree of the experienced emotion may vary, though; for
example, fear may range from wariness and apprehension to full-blown
terror, and anger and aggression from irritation to fury.195 Emotions may
be “pure” or mixed, or may occur in succession at different phases of the
event.196
Anxiety, an emotion related to fear but generally regarded as its own
distinct category, may occur on its own, though it more frequently
accompanies the other emotions.197 Ambiguity about the nature and degree
of the threat tends to create and amplify anxiety, as does uncertainty
regarding the adequacy of one’s resources and opportunities to counter
it.198 In addition, some individuals are at risk for greater anxiety.

189. Steimer, supra note 160, at 231–49.
190. R. J. R. Blair, Considering Anger from a Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective, 3 WILEY
INTERDISC. REV. COGNITIVE SCI. 65, 65–68 (2012).
191. Norman B. Schmidt et al., Exploring Human Freeze Responses to a Threat Stressor, 39 J.
BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 292, 292–304 (2008).
192. James J. Gross, Antecedent- and Response-Focused Emotion Regulation: Divergent
Consequences for Experience, Expression, and Physiology, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 224,
224–37 (1998). Training in techniques like biofeedback and Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT) can
also enable people to regulate the fight-or-flight response. See, e.g., Michael G. McKee & Christine
S. Moravec, Biofeedback in the Treatment of Heart Failure, 77 CLEVELAND CLINIC J. MED. S56, S56–
S57 (2010).
193. See James J. Gross, Sharpening the Focus: Emotion Regulation, Arousal, and Social
Competence, 9 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 287, 287–90 (1998).
194. MARKS, supra note 177, at 4, 7–9.
195. See id. at 3–9.
196. Shichuan Du & Aleix M. Martinez, Compound Facial Expressions of Emotion: From Basic
Research to Clinical Applications, 17 DIALOGUES IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 443, 444–46 (2015).
197. Steimer, supra note 160, at 233.
198. See generally Dan W. Grupe & Jack B. Nitschke, Uncertainty and Anticipation in Anxiety:
An Integrated Neurobiological and Psychological Perspective, 14 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 488
(2013).
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Individuals with high trait anxiety199 will typically respond with higher
levels of anxiety, as will people already experiencing significant stress.200
b.

Attention and Memory

Many aspects of attention and memory, which are considered
primary cognitive processes, are affected by the fight-or-flight response.
This section will focus largely on several areas of particular concern for
the excited utterance: startle and surprise; working memory; and selective
attention. This section will also look at how the fight-or-flight response
affects the formation of new memories and the individual’s subsequent
ability to access those memories.
i.

Startle and Surprise

The human nervous system has evolved several systems to help
mammals notice and respond to danger signals. This section will examine
two systems of particular importance for the excited utterance: startle and
surprise. Although Wigmore used the term “startling,” this section
explains that, from a technical perspective, he likely meant surprising.201
Startling, in the scientific sense, refers to an inborn, universal
physiological reflex-like response that occurs at the level of the spinal cord
or brainstem.202 It involves rapid, automatic, and strong behavioral
responses.203 Because these responses occur without processing in the
brain, they cannot be inhibited if unexpected. For example, if you touch a
hot stove you believe to be cool, you will jerk your hand away, literally
without thinking. If you touch it knowing it is hot, though, you may be
able to suppress the startle response and keep your hand in contact even
though it burns you.

199. Trait anxiety refers to an individual’s baseline anxiety and tendency to react to novel
experiences with anxiety. Trait anxiety appears to have a strong genetic component, but is also “set”
by early life experiences and modified by later life events. Powerful life events can reset trait anxiety
particularly higher, such as with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. See Steimer, supra note 160, at 242–
44; Carl. F. Weems & Stacy Overstreet, An Ecological-Needs-Based Perspective of Adolescent and
Youth Emotional Development in the Context of Disaster, in LIFESPAN PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL
DISASTERS: COPING WITH KATRINA, RITA, AND OTHER STORMS 38–39 (Katie E. Cherry ed., 2009).
200. See Bruce S. McEwen & Peter J. Gianaros, Central Role of the Brain in Stress and
Adaptation: Links to Socioeconomic Status, Health, and Disease, 1186 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI.
190, 190–222 (2010).
201. Although Wigmore likely misused the term, this Article will refer to the type of event that
supports the excited utterance exception as “startling” because that is the term that Wigmore and the
courts use. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
202. See Paul Ekman et al., Is the Startle Reaction an Emotion? 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1416, 1416–26 (1985).
203. See M. Koch, The Neurobiology of Startle, 59 PROGRESS IN NEUROBIOLOGY 107, 108
(1999).
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Stimuli that trigger the startle response involve elements of being
both sudden and unexpected, and of signaling imminent and serious harm;
they include sudden pain or injury, sudden loud noises or bright lights,
unexpected stimuli moving rapidly toward the face, abrupt loss of support
(e.g., an unanticipated fall), and unexpected proximity to a possible
predator (e.g., discovering a stranger in your house).204 Reflex startling
probably does indeed preclude lying—but only for the tiny, undetectable
fraction of a second before the information is transmitted to the brain for
further processing.
Surprise is the phenomenon more of issue in the excited utterance.
Surprise is a not a reflex but an emotion that involves cognitive evaluation
of something as unexpected.205 Something that startles you also surprises
you—but a fraction of a second later after you have had time to “think”
about it. The converse is not true though; something that surprises you did
not necessarily startle you physiologically first. Surprise differs from
startle in a variety of other ways too. It can be evoked by a greater variety
of stimuli and also has an emotional valence.206
It is also important to note that the excited utterance treats startling
events as binary—they are startling or they are not—but surprise, unlike
physiological startle, can vary in degree as well as valence. The more
surprising the event, the higher the arousal of the ensuing fight-or-flight
response is likely to be.207
ii.

Working Memory

Working memory refers to the brain’s active information processing
system.208 This system affects the sensory information and long-term
memories an individual can attend to and manipulate for nearly every type
of mental task, including interpreting new information, encoding and
storing new memories, applying new or well-practiced skills, making
judgments and decisions, and solving problems.209 It has particular
relevance to how people respond cognitively to non-normal events,
including the ability to lie and perceive events accurately, and so will be
reviewed here in some detail.

204. See Christian Grillon & Michael Davis, Fear-Potentiated Startle Conditioning in Humans:
Explicit and Contextual Cue Conditioning Following Paired Versus Unpaired Training, 34
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 451, 451–52 (1997).
205. Andrew Barto et al., Novelty or Surprise?, FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL., Dec. 11, 2013, at 2.
206. Ekman, supra note 202, at 1424.
207. Id.
208. Alan Baddeley, Working Memory: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 4 NATURE REV.
NEUROSCIENCE 829, 829–39 (2003).
209. Id.
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Despite its name, working memory involves not just memory, but
also attention and executive functions of the brain.210 Though there are
several competing models of precisely how working memory is structured
and operates, researchers generally agree that working memory is central
to human cognition.211 There is also general agreement that, in contrast to
long-term memory, working memory is a limited resource, though the
capacity of working memory varies among individuals.212 Psychologists
often refer to the amount of effort required to deal with the “stuff” on a
person’s working memory desktop as “cognitive load.”213
An analogy may be helpful for conceptualizing how working
memory operates generally. Visualize the foundational structure of an
individual’s working memory as akin to the work surface of an office
desk.214 Some individuals have bigger desks and some have smaller ones;
the size of the individual’s desktop will limit the amount of information
that individual can readily “see” and either use or act on at any given
moment.215
What is on someone’s working memory desktop at any given
moment is a mix of current sensory information from the environment,
recently acquired information that the brain has placed in short-term
memory, and previously “filed” information brought out of storage from
long-term memory, as well as whatever cognitive tasks the individual is
performing at the time.216 The mix of items on the working memory desk
will vary from individual to individual, as well as from moment to
moment, according to the demands of the tasks the brain is working on,
characteristics of the immediate environment, and the individual’s
resources.217
In the same way that people can usually only attend to the top paper
of a stack, so can people typically only attend to one chunk of complex
sensory information or memories at a time. For example, if you are
210. Executive functions are higher-order cognitive processes that make it possible to resist
temptations, cope with novel demands, play around with ideas, delay responses, and remain focused.
They are sometimes described as “top-down functions.” See Adele Diamond, Executive Functions, 64
ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 135, 135–68 (2013).
211. Eric Nestler et al., Chapter 13: Higher Cognitive Function and Behavioral Control, in
MOLECULAR NEUROPHARMACOLOGY: A FOUNDATION FOR CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 313–21 (2d ed.
2009).
212. WORKING MEMORY: CAPACITY, DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPROVEMENT TECHNIQUES (Eden
S. Levin ed., 2011).
213. John Sweller, Cognitive Load During Problem Solving: Effects on Learning, 12 COGNITIVE
SCIENCE 257, 257–85 (1988).
214. Henry L. Roediger III, Memory Metaphors in Cognitive Psychology, 8 MEMORY &
COGNITION 231, 231–46 (1980).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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concentrating on learning a phone number you are reading, you probably
cannot be simultaneously memorizing an address printed on a piece of
paper in the stack below it. An exception, though, occurs for skills or
processes that have been learned and practiced to the point that they have
become automatic and require little to no conscious thought to execute.218
For example, beginning drivers must devote a large space of their working
memory desk to every component skill and demand of driving—operating
the accelerator and brake smoothly and at the right times; turning the
steering wheel to maneuver around corners or obstacles, as well as make
small adjustments to keep the car properly oriented in the correct lane;
monitoring the positions and speeds of other cars on the road and
anticipating any changes in these; using turn signals or windshield wipers
effectively; and so on—but an experienced driver can skillfully operate a
car along a familiar route without ever thinking consciously about these
component tasks.219 In terms of our desk and papers analogy, think of the
beginning driver as having to spread papers for each component task
across the entire desk, but the experienced driver can adequately represent
the complex but automated skills with a small sticky note that says “drive
the car.”220
iii.

Selective Attention

Selective attention refers to the ability to control where one’s
attention is directed and how focused it is.221 The metaphor of a spotlight
captures how selective attention functions and how it interfaces with
working memory.222 A spotlight can be narrowly focused on just one item
on the working memory desk, leaving the peripheral items easily accessed
but temporarily in shadow/ignored, or the beam can be expanded to
illuminate many items at once for a “big picture” view, but at the cost of
making the light more diffuse and leaving details less clear.223 Individuals
vary generally in their ability to use selective attention effectively, and

218. BRIAN J. HOLT & SHAWN J. RAINEY, U.S. ARMY RES. INST. FOR BEHAV. & SOC. SCI., AN
OVERVIEW OF AUTOMATICITY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING THE THINKING PROCESS 7–10
(2001).
219. Id. at 13–15.
220. Id. We can also think of this in terms of cognitive load; for a new driver, a trip to the corner
store has a high cognitive load, but for an experienced driver it involves very little.
221. Jon Driver, A Selective Review of Selective Attention Research From the Past Century, 92
BRIT. J. OF PSYCHOL. 53, 65–66 (2001).
222. Id. at 65.
223. Id. This variation is sometimes described as the “zoom lens” model of attention. See Charles
W. Eriksen & James D. St. James, Visual Attention Within and Around the Field of Focal Attention:
A Zoom Lens Model, 40 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 239 (1986).
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their abilities to use selective attention are affected by situational
characteristics, including stress.224
iv.

Startling Events, Memory, and Flashbulb Memories

While memory may not seem a critical component of the excited
utterance because it concerns declarations about recent events, it can affect
the accuracy of both the content of the declarant’s utterance and the
recipient’s subsequent recall of the utterance. This section will give a
general but targeted overview of how memory functions both during a
startling event and subsequently. In particular, it will examine flashbulb
memories and their implications.
For an individual to utter something about a current event, he or she
must first form a sensory memory and then make an effort to transfer it to
short-term memory.225 Sensory memories are very brief, lasting a second
or less, and even short-term memories fade quickly; if not transferred to
long-term memory within twenty to forty seconds, short-term memories
will be “lost” and can never be retrieved after that point.226 The transfer
from short-term to long-term memory is an active process, not an
automatic one, though it can occur outside of conscious awareness.227
Whether the individual is aware or not, though, she is “editing” the content
of the memory at each step of the process as she prepares it for storage.228
Content may be further edited as it is recalled and repeated to self or
others.229
Most of the excited utterances of concern in legal matters likely
involve the declarant’s recent long-term memories. They have thus already
been subjected to some cognitive processing and the introduction of
possible distortion. Although research on the latency that prevents
significant contamination of recent memories is lacking, it seems

224. Driver, supra note 221.
225. R.C. Atkinson & R.M. Shiffrin, Human Memory: A Proposed System and Its Control
Processes, 2 PSYCHOL. OF LEARNING & MOTIVATION 89, 89–195 (1968).
226. Nelson Cowan, What Are the Differences Between Long-Term, Short-Term, and Working
Memory?, 169 PROGRESS IN BRAIN RES. 323, 323–38 (2008). Failure to encode a memory and transfer
it to long-term memory is what underlies problems like not being able to remember the name of the
person you met at a cocktail party last week; if you did not first attend to the name and then try to
remember it, the name is not stored in your memory and no amount of trying will enable you to recall
it.
227. Id.
228. Lynn Hasher & Rose T. Zacks, Automatic and Effortful Processes in Memory, 108 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 356, 356–58 (1979). Adults code most memories verbally; acute stress may
short-circuit this tendency though.
229. Atkinson, supra note 225.
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reasonable that the shorter the interval between the event and the utterance,
the less chance there will be for contamination.230
The memory of the recipient is also relevant for the eventual
reliability of the excited utterance, though, and the timing and likelihood
of contamination of the memory will vary considerably depending on the
length of time and circumstances until the recipient first repeats the
declarant’s utterance and in the interval between the first utterance and
when it is presented in court. The considerable body of research on the
unreliability of eyewitness testimony likely applies to these vicarious
memories as well.231
Startling events and the effects of the resulting fight-or-flight
response affect memory around the event in several ways. First,
information that is new, threatening, or otherwise emotionally powerful is
more likely to be attended to and brought into short term memory so that
it can be remembered—and more likely to be judged important enough to
store in long-term memory.232 Second, a startling event that is especially
sudden or upsetting may cause permanent loss of information held in
short-term memory at the time of the event, by preventing it from ever
being transferred to long-term memory.233 Individuals may recognize that
they are missing those memories, or they may “fill in” missing details and
believe they remember them.234 This finding suggests that utterances
concerning information in the period just before the startling event should
likely be considered less reliable. Finally, memories formed during
extreme levels of stress are highly susceptible to bias and
contamination.235
In general, stress and arousal affect both the formation of new
memories and retrieval of old memories, according to the Yerkes-Dodson
law: simple memories are most likely to be formed accurately when
arousal and motivation are high; however, arousal affects the accurate

230. Ralph Norman Haber & Lynn Haber, Experiencing, Remembering and Reporting Events, 6
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 1057, 1057–97 (2000). Although quick retrieval minimizes most afterthe-fact contamination, it does not undo any bias operating at the time the event was perceived or
placed in storage.
231. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL.
277, 277–95 (2003).
232. Ap Dijksterhuis & Henk Aarts, On Wildebeests and Humans: The Preferential Detection
of Negative Stimuli, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 14, 14–18 (2003).
233. Ulrike Rimmele et al., Emotion Enhances the Subjective Feeling of Remembering, Despite
Lower Accuracy for Contextual Details, 11 EMOTION 553, 554–55 (2011).
234. Id. at 558–61.
235. C.A. Morgan III, et al., Misinformation Can Influence Memory for Recently Experienced,
Highly Stressful Events, INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 36 (2013).
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formation of complex memories in an inverted-U shape.236 That is, both
very low and very high levels of stress interfere with creating new
memories and later recall, while moderate levels of stress create optimal
levels for memory.237 For the excited utterance exception, this means that
the declarant’s level of arousal and the complexity of the content of the
utterance will affect the likely reliability of the memory and subsequent
statement, and in ways not necessarily apparent to the recipient or a judge.
In addition, memories of startling events are processed differently
from other types of memories and are likely to be vivid and detailed.238
These “flashbulb memories” are a subcategory of memories for
episodes.239 Both people directly involved in an event and those who hear
about it subsequently may form flashbulb memories.240 Under the
influence of stress hormones, these memories are formed using different
systems and brain structures than procedural or information-related
memories, or even other kinds of episodic memories, and tend to be
recalled in holistic fashion, much like a mental snapshot that includes
many kinds of sensory detail.241
The focus and content of the “snapshot” may vary according to what
details are attended to based on level of threat and arousal, as well as other
individual factors and situational differences.242 Thus, a bystander at a safe
distance from a startling event like a robbery might have a flashbulb
memory resembling a wide-angle snapshot that includes lots of
unnecessary detail, like the clothes on a mannequin in a nearby store, while
the “snapshot” memory of the victim might be a sharp-focus close-up of
the assailant’s weapon that fails to capture important details like the face
of the robber.
Flashbulb memories have a curious disconnect: individuals’
confidence in the accuracy of their flashbulb memories tends to be
unusually high—but the actual reliability is no greater than for memories
of more mundane events over the same time period (which is to say, not
so great after the first few minutes).243 Researchers who tracked and
compared the flashbulb memories of adults for major events like 9/11 and
236. David M. Diamond et al., The Temporal Dynamics Model of Emotional Memory
Processing: A Synthesis on the Neurobiological Basis of Stress-Induced Amnesia, Flashbulb and
Traumatic Memories, and the Yerkes-Dodson Law, 2007 NEURAL PLASTICITY 33 (2007).
237. Id.
238. Roger Brown & James Kulik, Flashbulb Memories, 5 COGNITION 73, 73–99 (1977).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Emanuele Coluccia et al., Autobiographical and Event Memories for Surprising and
Unsurprising Events, 24 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 177, 177–99 (2010).
243. Andrew R.A. Conway et al., Flashbulb Memory for 11 September 2001, 23 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 605, 605–23 (2009).
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natural disasters consistently find this inconsistency between accuracy of
the memory and confidence that it is correctly recalled.244 Thus, recipients
of excited utterances may believe intensely, but incorrectly, that their
memories of the excited utterance are complete and accurate, which could
cause judges and juries to accord the hearsay statements unwarranted
credibility.
c.

Perception

Research is clear that the fight-or-flight response affects individuals’
perceptions of an event in ways that may increase the likelihood of
mistakes.245 Because the amygdala prioritizes safety and survival, quick
assessments and defensive judgments prevail over deliberate and thorough
analyses.246 Thus, independent of reality, people are more likely to
perceive threats, more likely to overestimate the degree of threat, and more
likely to attribute ill-intent to others when they are experiencing the fightor-flight response.247 Because stereotypes and prejudices (consciously or
unconsciously held) facilitate fast decision-making, individuals will also
tend to rely on them more heavily to evaluate situations and the intents of
others; these sorts of perceptual biases can also lead to errors in judgments
and decision-making and in subsequent interpretations and memories of
the event.248
d.

Cognition

By their nature, the kinds of situations that provoke the fight-or-flight
response—typically dynamic, unpredictable, time-sensitive, and high
stakes situations249—place high demands on individuals’ higher-order
cognitive resources.250 Cognition during the acute phase of a threat focuses
on several critical tasks: appraisal of the nature of the threat, appraisal of
the individual’s resources in dealing with the threat, generation of
244. Id.; see also Jennifer M. Talarico & David C. Rubin, Confidence, Not Consistency,
Characterizes Flashbulb Memories, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 455, 455–61 (2003).
245. Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Expectancies, Emotion, and Memory Reports for
Visual Events, in THE VISUAL WORLD IN MEMORY 178–214 (James R. Brockmole ed., 2008).
246. Steimer, supra note 160, at 238.
247. Jennifer Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 146, 146–59 (2001); Paul Ekman et al., Autonomic Nervous System Activity Distinguishes
Among Emotions, 221 SCI. 1208, 1208–10 (1983).
248. Irving L. Janis, Decision Making Under Stress, in HANDBOOK OF STRESS: THEORETICAL &
CLINICAL ASPECTS 69–87 ( Leo Goldberger & Shlomo Breznitz eds., 1982).
249. See generally Lyle E. Bourne, Jr. & Rita A. Yaroush, Stress and Cognition: A Cognitive
Psychological
Perspective
(Sept.
2003)
(unpublished
manuscript)
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20040034070.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34D4DJ39].
250. Id.
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solutions for escaping or otherwise combatting the threat, and decisionmaking regarding the options for doing so.251
From brain scans of individuals under stress, though, we know that
the parts of the brain involved in processing complex information are less
“online” during crises.252 In addition, because of the urgency necessary to
respond to threats that trigger the fight-or-flight response, the brain
prioritizes speed of processing, further limiting higher order processes like
systematic decision-making.253 Thus, individuals often find it difficult-toimpossible to use higher order cognitive skills during a threatening
situation, which may limit their behavioral responses to ones that are
automatic, habitual, or easy.254 For example, individuals tend to use broad
generalizations, black-and-white choices, and stereotyping to guide
judgments and to rely on habitual behavioral patterns or first-thought
action plans rather than generating and evaluating a range of options to
choose between.255 These mental shortcuts are known as heuristics.256
e.

Behavior

As is obvious from the name, the two most recognized broad
behavior patterns evoked by the fight-or-flight response are fighting or
fleeing.257 Flight, which is the more common of the two options, may entail
running away from the threat and/or escaping toward a place (or people)
of safety.258 Similarly, fighting may be aimed against the threat or toward
creating a pathway to safety.259 Although the body’s responses are best
suited for actual physical fight-or-flight, research shows that individuals
251. See Amos Tversky & David Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
252. Katrin Starcke & Matthias Brand, Decision Making Under Stress: A Selective Review, 36
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 1228, 1228–48 (2012).
253. Bourne, supra note 249, at 31–32; see generally Dalal A. ALQahtani, Does Time Pressure
Have a Negative Effect on Diagnostic Accuracy?, 91 ACAD. MED. 710 (2016).
254. Phillip M. Kleespies, Training for Decision-Making Under the Stress of Emergency
Conditions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL EMERGENCIES AND CRISES 21 (Phillip M.
Kleespies ed., 2016).
255. MICHAEL ST.PIERRE ET AL., CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN ACUTE CARE SETTINGS: HUMAN
FACTORS AND TEAM PSYCHOLOGY IN A HIGH STAKES ENVIRONMENT 10 (2007).
256. Rongjun Yu, Stress Potentiates Decision Biases: A Stress Induced Deliberation-to-Intuition
(SIDI) Model, 3 NEUROBIOLOGY STRESS 83, 83–95 (2016); Tversky, supra note 251, at 1124.
257. D. Caroline Blanchard et al., Human Defensive Behaviors to Threat Scenarios Show
Parallels to Fear- and Anxiety-Related Defense Patterns of Non-Human Mammals, 25
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 761, 761–70 (2001).
258. Paulo Domenici & Graeme D. Ruxton, Prey Behaviors During Fleeing: Escape
Trajectories, Signaling, and Sensory Defenses, in ESCAPING FROM PREDATORS: AN INTEGRATIVE
VIEW OF ESCAPE DECISIONS 199–224 (William E. Cooper & Daniel T. Blumstein eds., 2015).
259. Jaak Panksepp, The Psychoneurology of Fear: Evolutionary Perspectives and the Role of
Animal Models in Understanding Human Anxiety, in 3 HANDBOOK OF ANXIETY: THE NEUROBIOLOGY
OF ANXIETY 58 (Graham D. Burrows et al. eds., 1990).
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may also or instead resort to symbolic or psychological forms of these
behaviors, such as creating psychological distance, using words as
weapons, or making threat displays (like brandishing a gun or making
threatening gestures).260
However, in the century since the response was first identified,
research has revealed that the physiological changes associated with the
body’s response to threats support other common behavior patterns in
addition to fight or flight. In particular, research has confirmed that
freezing, sometimes described as a “fawn” response, is often the first
response to a possible threat, particularly when the threat is distant or
uncertain.261 Additionally, a similar but distinct behavior pattern may
occur later in the event when an individual judges that the threat is too
great and there is no path for escape. In these situations, individuals may
experience tonic immobility (also called the “fright” response)—a
temporary but often complete “paralysis” of thought or action, or even
actual collapse (e.g., fainting).262 Related behavior patterns may involve
shielding (e.g., cowering or using hands or objects to protect vulnerable
body parts), hiding, trying to “fade into the background” in some way
(including “playing dead”), or diverting the aggressor’s attention.263
Another well-documented behavior pattern, known as “tend and
befriend,” is particularly common in women, for whom fighting and
fleeing are less likely to be effective options and in whom the stress
response stimulates release of another hormone, oxytocin.264 The tend and
befriend pattern centers on protection and care of young and/or cultivating
and enlisting social support, particularly from other women, as
protection.265 In addition, interpersonal threats that result in stimulation of
the fight-or-flight response may also result in patterns of submissive and
placating behaviors, including efforts to defuse the situation, soothing,
agreeing, or efforts at negotiation or reasoning.266 Attempts at defusing are
more likely when individuals perceive themselves as physically
mismatched with the peril, lower in the social hierarchy than the aggressor,

260. Id.
261. Norman B. Schmidt et al., Exploring Human Freeze Responses to a Threat Stressor, 39 J.
BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 292, 292–304 (2008).
262. H. Stefan Bracha, MD, Freeze, Flight, Fight, Fright, Faint: Adaptationist Perspectives on
the Acute Stress Response Spectrum, 9 CNS SPECTRUMS 679, 679–85 (2004).
263. Id.
264. Shelley E. Taylor, Tend and Befriend: Biobehavioral Bases of Affiliation Under Stress, 15
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 273, 273–77 (2006).
265. Id.
266. Paul Gilbert, Defence and Safety: Their Function in Social Behaviour and
Psychopathology, 32 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 131, 131–53 (1993).
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or skilled at obtaining safety through negotiating.267 This style of response
is common among many of the victims in domestic violence situations.268
Note that these patterns may explicitly include the use of deception for
self- or other-protection.
Because human beings are social animals, their behavior in the face
of threat is often modified by the proximity of others.269 Thus, behavioral
patterns when others are present or nearby may include protective actions
directed toward others rather than, or in addition to, the self, ranging from
sentinel behavior (e.g., shouting warnings) to actively aiding others (e.g.,
pushing to safety, shielding, or fighting on behalf of another), even at the
risk of one’s own safety.270 Protective actions are most likely to be directed
toward those for whom the actor feels responsible in some way, such as
one’s own children, those in one’s protective custody, or individuals
perceived as members of a vulnerable group or as part of a group to whom
the actor also belongs.271
People’s perceptions of the threat and their initial reactions are also
affected by their proximities to others and their relationships to those
others. For example, studies of real life crises and natural disasters have
found that people are slower to recognize and respond to signs of a threat
when they are with close family members than when they are alone or with
strangers.272 Consistent with these findings, witness statements of people
on holiday or at a recreational event with friends and family members
when a terroristic attack occurred typically contain accounts that the
witness perceived the event to be benign in nature, although it was in fact
threatening. For example, when an audience member present with fellow
Air Force members during the Aurora, Colorado movie theater shooting
in 2015 described his reaction to the first shots fired his way, he stated
“[t]o be honest, my first idea was fireworks.”273 Derick Spruel, whose
friend and fellow airman Jesse Childress was killed in the shooting,

267. Laura A. Harrison et al., Exploring the Structure of Human Defensive Responses from
Judgments of Threat Scenarios, 10 PLOS ONE 16 (2015); Blanchard, supra note 257, at 761–70.
268. Lisa Goodman et al., The Intimate Partner Violence Strategies Index: Development and
Application, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163, 163–86 (2003).
269. Tsachi Ein-Dor, Facing Danger: How Do People Behave in Times of Need? The Case of
Adult Attachment Styles, 5 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL., Dec. 10, 2014, at 1, 1–6 (2014).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Jonathan D. Sime, Affiliative Behaviour During Escape to Building Exits, 3 J. ENVTL.
PSYCHOL. 21, 21–41 (1983); Gerta Köster et al., On Modelling the Influence of Group Formations in
a Crowd, 6 CONTEMP. SOC. SCI. 397, 397–414 (2011).
273. Jordan Steffen, Aurora Theater Shooting Victims Recall Terror, Confusion Amid Attack,
DENV. POST (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2015/04/28/aurora-theater-shootingvictims-recall-terror-confusion-amid-attack/ [https://perma.cc/X4JJ-ZA7D].
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explained “I thought it was a prank at first. I feel real bad to say this, but I
really tried to continue to watch the movie.”274
Attachment psychology theorists explain this sort of reaction as
stemming from the feelings of safety we derive from being with others we
know and expect to protect us.275
Individuals also take their cues for how to react by observing the
behaviors of others. Seeing others running fast in the opposite direction or
hearing screams of alarm, for example, can be potent triggers for flight.276
Many mass panic stampedes seem to be caused by this phenomenon; for
example, a panic in a crowd watching a soccer match in a Turin, Italy
piazza, possibly triggered by a firecracker, resulted in more than 1,500
people being trampled and injured, some seriously. One witness stated,
“No one heard the bang . . . . The noise we heard was that of the crowd
running and screaming, and so obviously we thought there had been an
attack.”277 Alternatively, seeing others calmly continuing to go about their
normal business may lead people to interpret a crisis as benign and thus
fail to act promptly.278 For example, authorities noted that many of the
vulnerable residents of Galveston who failed to evacuate before Hurricane
Ike in 2008 may have been lulled into a false sense of safety by the
presence of on-scene broadcasters, who apparently thought it was safe
enough to remain.279
3.

Situational Differences

In general, the greater, more direct, and more imminent a threat to an
individual’s safety or survival—or, more precisely, the more an individual
appraises a threat in those ways—the stronger the level of autonomic
arousal will be.280 Arousal will also be stronger when individuals evaluate
their resources and opportunities within the situation as inadequate in the
274. Id.
275. See generally Jeffry A. Simpson, Attachment Theory in Modern Evolutionary Perspective,
in HANDBOOK OF ATTACHMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 115–40 (Jude
Cassidy & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 1999).
276. ANTHONY R. MAWSON, MASS PANIC AND SOCIAL ATTACHMENT: THE DYNAMICS OF
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 235–36 (Kindle ed. 2012).
277. Sofia Lotto Persio, Turin: How a False Alarm Led to Mass Injuries During a Champions
League Match Viewing, NEWSWEEK (June 5, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/turin-how-falsealarm-left-more-1500-injured-during-champions-league-620910 [https://perma.cc/J8ED-W83D].
278. Daniel Nilsson & Anders Johansson, Social Influence During the Initial Phase of a Fire
Evacuation-Analysis of Evacuation Experiments in a Cinema Theatre, 44 FIRE SAFETY J. 71, 71–79
(2009).
279. Willie Drye, Why Hurricane Ike’s “Certain Death” Warning Failed, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/09/080926-hurricane-ikeevacuation.html [https://perma.cc/346W-7GPX].
280. Randolph J. Paterson & Richard W. Neufeld, Clear Danger: Situational Determinants of
the Appraisal of Threat, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 404, 404–16 (1987).

150

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:1

face of the threat.281 Arousal strength is similarly affected by the degree of
perceived threat to someone whom an individual is highly motivated to
protect. 282
Moreover, the role of someone in a traumatic situation will also
typically affect the degree of arousal. Individuals can be participants—and
participants can be either the initiators of the situation or victims—or
bystanders/witnesses. Both roles and the various relationships between
participants and bystanders affect arousal levels and behavior.283 The
situation may occur between or in proximity to people who know one
another or may involve strangers.
Usually, someone directly involved in a traumatic situation will have
greater autonomic arousal than a bystander will, and someone who is not
directly involved but who identifies strongly with one or more of the
participants will respond more strongly than a neutral bystander.284 These
nuances all have implications for the trustworthiness of a particular
declarant.
4.

Individual Differences in Arousal

Individual differences also affect how easily or strongly the fight-orflight system is activated. Some of these differences are innate,285 while
others are the result of early life experiences that predispose individuals to
be more or less reactive.286 In addition, later learning experiences, direct
or vicarious, affect nervous system reactivity, sometimes powerfully.287
Learning can also affect which stimuli cause different levels of arousal;
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is an extreme example of how
learning may affect both triggers and arousal strength.288
Recent experiences with other threat-related events, whether
experienced directly or vicariously, can also “prime” the fight-or-flight
281. See id.
282. David S. Goldstein, Sympathetic Nervous System, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STRESS 558
(George Fink ed., 2000).
283. See Gregory R. Janson & Richard J. Hazler, Trauma Reactions of Bystanders and Victims
to Repetitive Abuse Experiences, 19 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 239, 239–55 (2004).
284. Id.
285. W. Thomas Boyce & Bruce J. Ellis, Biological Sensitivity to Context: I. An Evolutionary–
Developmental Theory of the Origins and Functions of Stress Reactivity, 17 DEVEL. &
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 271, 275–78 (2005).
286. Katie A. McLaughlin et al., Causal Effects of the Early Caregiving Environment on
Development of Stress Response Systems in Children, 112 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 5637,
5637–42 (2015).
287. Michael Davis, The Role of the Amygdala in Conditioned and Unconditioned Fear and
Anxiety, in THE AMYGDALA 213–87 (John P. Aggleton ed., 2000).
288. Jonathan E. Sherin & Charles B. Nemeroff, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: The
Neurobiological Impact of Psychological Trauma, 13 DIALOGUES IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 263,
263–78 (2011).
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response, allowing it to occur more readily or strongly, or in response to
particular stimuli.289 For example, in the wake of the Boston Marathon
bombings, many people experienced strong fight-or-flight reactions in the
presence of abandoned backpacks, whether or not they had been present
at the bombing.290
These individual and situational variations are of particular note for
the excited utterance exception. Because both objective features of an
event and demeanor of the declarant are poor indicators of the declarant’s
arousal level, it is likely difficult for an untrained observer to judge the
declarant’s arousal level accurately without at least cursory knowledge of
the declarant’s innate tendencies and personal history.
5.

Latency of the Fight-or-Flight Response

The fight-or-flight response is activated rapidly and is typically
perceived by affected individuals as happening instantaneously and
globally.291 How long the response lasts depends largely on how long it is
needed; there is no set period for which an individual will be aroused and
then recover.292 Once a threat has passed, the parasympathetic nervous
system acts to reverse the changes associated with arousal and return the
individual to homeostasis.293 This system is sometimes known colloquially
as the “rest-and-digest” system or the “feed-and-breed” system, for
activities that are best carried out in the absence of threats. The
parasympathetic nervous system operates more slowly than the
sympathetic one; time is needed to remove the circulating stress hormones
from the system and replenish resources used during the fight-or-flight
response (which is why people often continue to feel “shaky” or “worked
up” even hours or days after experiencing a traumatic event).294
6.

Demeanor and the Fight-or-Flight Response

Because the use of the excited utterance exception partly rests on the
ability of those hearing the utterance to distinguish whether an individual
289. Randall D. Marshall et al., The Psychology of Ongoing Threat: Relative Risk Appraisal, the
September 11 Attacks, and Terrorism-Related Fears, 62 AM. PSYCHOL. 304, 304–16 (2007).
290. CNN Wire, Boston Bomb Squad Investigates Backpack Near Boston Marathon Finish Line,
KDVR (Apr. 16, 2014, 6:45 AM), http://kdvr.com/2014/04/15/boston-bomb-squad-investigatesbackpack-near-boston-marathon-finish-line/ [https://perma.cc/667C-9WFJ].
291. Research using fMRI technology and other advanced imaging techniques, however, has
shown that the response affects different neurological and hormonal systems in sequence, not all at
once. See Hugo D. Critchley, Psychophysiology of Neural, Cognitive and Affective Integration: fMRI
and Autonomic Indicants, 73 INT’L J. PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 88, 88–94 (2009).
292. Steimer, supra note 160.
293. McCorry, supra note 174, at 3–4.
294. CANNON, supra note 154.
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is in fact experiencing a state of excitement, it is important to consider
whether the effects of fight-or-flight activation are readily and reliably
detectable without training.
The classic expectation is that someone who is experiencing the
fight-or-flight response will be visibly agitated, with scared, anxious,
surprised, or angry facial expressions, obvious rapid breathing, sweating,
and other visible indicators of the fight-or-flight response.295 Research
shows, however, that most people are poor judges of whether other
individuals are displaying genuine or faked emotions.296 Even people
generally trained in emotional observation tend to be poor judges of
whether demeanor is being faked without advanced training or use of
equipment that facilitates detection of fleeting facial expressions.297
Ordinary observers may make false negative errors too; that is, they
confuse controlled or “blank” expressions and body language with lack of
emotional reaction.298 During a crisis, individuals may suppress their
emotions for protective reasons. Examples where these kinds of reactions
are common include domestic assaults, where the victim may have learned
that appearing frightened exacerbates the assault,299 in people pulled over
by police who expect that looking polite or friendly will reduce the risk
that a situation escalates, or in first responders who mask their emotions
in order to better comfort victims.300 After a period of such emotional
suppression, actual emotions may be expressed later when it seems safe to
do so or when the individual can no longer muster the energy to suppress
them.301 Other people respond to abnormal events with inappropriate
affect; their behavior too is likely to be misinterpreted.302

295. See, e.g., Margarita Tartakovsky, Panicked Over Public Speaking? A Holistic Approach
That Helps, PSYCH CENTRAL (May 17, 2016), https://psychcentral.com/lib/panicked-over-publicspeaking-a-holistic-approach-that-helps/ [https://perma.cc/FY4P-2YZ2].
296. PAUL EKMAN & WALLACE V. FRIESEN, UNMASKING THE FACE: A GUIDE TO RECOGNIZING
EMOTIONS FROM FACIAL CLUES, 144–53 (2003); Stephen Porter & Leanne ten Brinke, Reading
Between the Lies: Identifying Concealed and Falsified Emotions in Universal Facial Expressions, 19
PSYCHOL. SCI. 508, 508–14 (2008).
297. Id.
298. Emily Butler et al., The Social Consequences of Expressive Suppression, 3 EMOTION 48,
56–57 (2003).
299. SCOTT ALLEN JOHNSON, PHYSICAL ABUSERS AND SEXUAL OFFENDERS: FORENSIC AND
CLINICAL STRATEGIES 13 (2006).
300. Renae Hayward & Michelle R. Tuckey, Global and Occupation-Specific Emotional
Resources as Buffers Against the Emotional Demands of Fire-Fighting, 60 APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1, 1–
23 (2011).
301. Id.
302. Richard Lazarus, The Stable and Unstable in Emotion, in THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS:
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 78–85 (Richard J. Davidson & Paul Ekman eds., 1994).
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B. Putting It All Together: How the Fight-or-Flight Response Affects
Deception, Perceptual Errors, Communication, and, Ultimately,
Reliability
1.

Deception

Because the excited utterance exception rests most fundamentally on
the hypothesis that people are unable to lie when experiencing the
emotions of a startling event, the logical first step in evaluating its validity
is to examine the research on whether people can lie spontaneously while
under that kind of acute and severe stress.
Unfortunately, the gold-standard controlled experiments that would
best answer the question are neither ethically nor practically feasible;
therefore, that level of directly relevant scientific evidence does not exist
and likely never will. But useful evidence to answer this question can be
culled from other sources, including controlled experiments of lying under
lower levels of stress and arousal (such as while performing complex
arithmetic or holding one’s hand in ice water), as well as from experiments
of performance of different complex behaviors in high-stress simulations
(e.g., military, medical, and aviation crises), and from observations of
deception that occur in natural startling situations.
This section will show that the short answer to the question, “Can
people lie while in an excited state after a startling event?” is yes. In fact,
to the extent that lying may be a useful or well-practiced protective
behavior, it may even be a likely behavior in response to many threatening
situations.303 The scientific evidence, though, will also show that a full
answer to this question is longer and more complicated: individuals vary
in their inclination and ability to lie while under stress, in the types of lies
they tell while in an excited state, and in the sorts of conditions under
which they are more or less motivated or able to lie.
This section will open with a review of relevant general research
about lying, including a working definition of lying, an examination of
who lies (including developmental, cultural, and individual
characteristics), and situational and individual factors that affect why and
when people are more or less likely to lie. It will conclude with a more
specific look at the science about lying while in an excited state.

303. Bella M. DePaulo et al., Serious Lies, 26 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.147, 147–67
(2004).
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Definition of Lying

A lie is a statement the speaker believes to be untrue told with the
intent of deceiving a target.304 Thus, when a magician says she is sawing a
man in half, it is not lying because she knows the audience realizes it will
be an illusion. If a young child says something untrue because of
misunderstanding, that also is not lying, because the child’s intent is not
to deceive. Telling a child that Santa Claus is a real person who will bring
him gifts if he behaves well, however, is lying—the speaker knows the
statement to be untrue and intends for the target to believe it.
Although that definition of lying is simple and straightforward, lies
are actually a complex phenomenon and can vary on many dimensions.305
They can:
1. Have different intents/motivations. Lies can be intended
to obtain something desired, or to protect against a negative
consequence. More specifically, they can be self-serving (also
known as egoistic—like someone inflating his income or
deflating his weight to seem more attractive on a dating site),
prosocial (also known as other-oriented—like a doctor lying
about a patient’s prognosis to prevent despair), antisocial (or
other-harming—like falsely accusing a work rival of
mismanagement simply to cause him harm), or some
combination of the above.306
2. Vary in magnitude of consequence. Lies may range from
minor or low-stakes (like responding to a telephone inquiry of
“How are you?” with “Fine,” when you are actually battling a
cold) to serious or high stakes (like falsely blaming someone
else for a serious crime).307
3. Range in complexity and degree. Lies may involve
fudging—slightly exaggerating or deceiving by omitting a
minor fact—to creating a complex, detailed fiction.308

304. Bella M. DePaulo et al., Lying in Everyday Life, 70 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 979, 979–95
(1996).
305. Bella M. DePaulo, The Many Faces of Lies, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND
EVIL 303–26 (Arthur Miller ed., 2004); Jeffrey J. Walczyk et al., A Social-Cognitive Framework for
Understanding Serious Lies: Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory 34 NEW IDEAS IN
PSYCHOL. 22, 22–36 (2004).
306. DePaulo, supra note 304; Walczyk supra note 305, at 26.
307. DePaulo, supra note 304, at 991–94.
308. Id.; see also List of Confidence Tricks, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
confidence_tricks [https://perma.cc/F86T-4QU4].
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4. Vary in how false impressions are created. There are lies
of omission and commission, lies that withhold relevant
information or add distracting extraneous information to create
or permit a wrong impression, and lies that involve falsely
denying knowledge or pleading poor memory. “Half-lies” and
other partial truths can have the same impact as a complete lie
while being cloaked with true elements.309
5. Finally, lies may morph from deliberate to mistaken.
People may come to believe their lies, either quickly or over
time.310
For purposes of the excited utterance, the focus is primarily on a
subset of the possible types of lies—spontaneous ones of commission that
potentially have significant consequences. This subset, though, still
encompasses a wide range of different kinds of lies, including a range of
intents and degrees of seriousness. In addition, the exception sometimes
includes part-lies of omission, where something true is uttered but
additional known information that would change the impact of the
statement is omitted,311 as well as wholly true statements intended to create
deception through distraction or misdirection. It is useful to keep this
complexity in mind when considering the possibility of lying under stress.
b.

Who Lies

We are all Pinocchio; lying is a near universal behavior with a high
rate of frequency. Studies of self-reported lying using diary reports
commonly find that virtually all cognitively healthy adults lie, with the
mean frequency of lying ranging from about 0.59 to 1.96 lies per day.312
One large-scale study using retrospective recall of the previous twentyfour hours found a similar mean number of lies but lower prevalence, with
less than half of adults (just over 40%) reporting lying during the previous
day, and a small percentage of individuals (about 5%) responsible for the
majority of lies during that period—though nearly all the subjects reported

309. DePaulo, supra note 304, at 983.
310. William von Hippel & Robert Trivers, The Evolution and Psychology of Self-Deception,
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI., Feb. 3, 2011, at 1, 1–56.
311. For example, a mostly true statement like, “I saw a tall man running from the scene who
looked suspicious!” might create a false impression of the guilty party’s identity if what is unsaid is,
“But I know he didn’t commit the crime because I did.”
312. DePaulo, supra note 304; Joey George & Alastair Robb, Deception and ComputerMediated Communication in Daily Life, 21 COMM. REP. 92, 92–103 (2008); Jeffrey T. Hancock et al.,
Deception and Design: The Impact of Communication Technology on Lying Behavior, 6 PROC. OF THE
SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 129, 129–34 (2004).
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lying during the previous week.313 A study that used videotaped
interactions between strangers found that 60% of the subjects lied at least
once in the course of a ten-minute conversation and those 60% told three
lies on average; the biggest liars told a dozen lies in ten minutes.314
In any event, lying is universal and frequent but varies considerably
in rate between individuals. It also varies in seriousness; the majority of
lies are minor or prosocial, with most people reporting telling one or fewer
significant lies per week.315 Among significant lies, several studies have
found that protective lies are more common than lies told for gain.316 The
important takeaways of this research for the excited utterance are that lying
is a common protective tool, and that most people are capable of telling
serious lies.
The ability to lie develops early in life and the timing seems to be
related to the level of cognitive development.317 Laboratory observations
and experiments with young children subjected to strong temptations
followed by self-report of their behavior find that young children yield to
temptation at a high rate and may well lie about whether they did,
particularly when they fear negative consequences for their
misbehavior.318 Lying to avoid negative consequences or for personal gain
develops in many children as early as two or three years of age and is
almost universal by age four, though it may take children years to become
skilled liars whose falsehoods are hard for adults to detect.319 Nonetheless,
the early onset of the ability to lie is important to consider when weighing
the use of hearsay statements by children in legal proceedings.
As pretty much every parent discovers, lying is more common at
some ages than at others. In general, the rate of lying is lowest at the
youngest ages and increases through adolescence when it typically reaches
its lifetime peak.320 The frequency of lying then declines over the course

313. Kim B. Serota et al., Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Self-Reported Lies,
36 HUM. COMM. RES. 2, 2–25 (2010). Note, though, that because survey studies like this and the ones
above rely on self-report, it is possible that subjects lied about lying.
314. Robert S. Feldman et al., Self-Presentation and Verbal Deception: Do Self-Presenters Lie
More?, 24 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 163, 163–70 (2002).
315. DePaulo, supra note 304.
316. Beata Arcimowicz et al., Motivation and Consequences of Lying. A Qualitative Analysis of
Everyday Lying, 16 FORUM: QUALITATIVE SOC. RES. 16 (2015); DePaulo, supra note 304.
317. Kang Lee, Little Liars: Development of Verbal Deception in Children, 7 CHILD DEV. PERSP.
91, 91–96 (2013).
318. Id.
319. Victoria Talwar & Kang Lee, Social and Cognitive Correlates of Children’s Lying
Behavior, 79 CHILD DEV. 866, 866–81 (2008).
320. Lene Arnett Jensen et al., The Right to Do Wrong: Lying to Parents Among Adolescents
and Emerging Adults, 33 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 101, 101–12 (2004).
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of adulthood and returns to about the same level as during the preschool
years after the age of sixty.321
The probability that a given individual will lie in a given
circumstance is influenced partly by experience. Frequent liars are more
likely to lie again; lying is like other skills and habits in that practice
strengthens it. A recent study shows that telling small lies actually creates
changes in the individual’s brain (specifically in the amygdala) which
increase the likelihood that he or she will tell more, and bigger, lies in the
future—a sort of neural slippery slope for lying.322 The chances of lying
are also influenced by the individual’s learning about the rewards and risks
of lying or telling the truth, and by their experiences with getting caught—
or getting away with lying.323
Lying is also affected by cultural and subcultural norms that define
circumstances when lying is expected—or unacceptable. For example,
certain groups and subcultures may see lying to authorities as reasonable
(or even demanded) to protect one another (e.g., “honor among thieves”
and “brotherhood” loyalty among fraternity members),324 and police may
see lying as honorable to protect one another (i.e., the “blue wall of
silence”)325 or to achieve what they believe to be justice (e.g.,
“testilying”).326 In the United States, lying is commonplace to the point of
being generally assumed in situations where people are expected to put
their best selves forward, such as in job interviews327 or on online dating
sites328 but the degree of misinforming is generally small.329 Americans
321. Evelyne Debey et al., From Junior to Senior Pinocchio: A Cross-Sectional Lifespan
Investigation of Deception, 160 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 58, 58–68 (2015).
322. Neil Garrett et al., The Brain Adapts to Dishonesty, 19 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1727,
1727–32 (2016).
323. Talwar, supra note 319.
324. Patricia Yancey Martin & Robert A. Hummer, Fraternities and Rape on Campus, 3
GENDER & SOC. 457, 457–73 (1989).
325. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” As Evidence of Bias and
Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998).
326. Radley Balko, How Do We Fix the Police ‘Testilying’ Problem?, WASH. POST (Apr. 16,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/16/how-do-we-fix-the-policetestilying-problem/ [https://perma.cc/LRB6-XWW9].
327. Julia Levashina & Michael A. Campion, Measuring Faking in the Employment Interview:
Development and Validation of an Interview Faking Behavior Scale. 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1638,
1638–56 (2007).
328. One study of online dating profiles found that nine out of ten people fudged at least one of
the assessed areas on their profile. See Jeffrey T. Hancock et al., The Truth About Lying in Online
Dating Profiles, PROC. OF THE SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 449, 451–52
(2007).
329. See id.; Levashina, supra note 327. Both studies found that there is essentially an unspoken
agreement about how much lying is acceptable; for example, people may shave five pounds off their
weight, but not falsely claim to have performed military service; people may exaggerate their salary
at their previous job by 5% but not claim to have earned a degree they did not.
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also expect—and often forgive—a certain degree of lying by politicians,
salespeople, and, yes, lawyers.330 On the other hand, lies told for personal
gain that harm innocent people are almost universally considered
unacceptable.331
For purposes of the excited utterance, the important takeaways from
this review of who lies are: a) lying is a universal and frequent behavior;
b) most lying is minor, but the majority of people nonetheless tell some
significant lies on a regular basis; c) there are significant group and
individual variables that affect who is most likely to lie and when—but
mostly these are not readily observable characteristics.
c.
i.

The Decision to Lie

Dual Processing Theory: A Social Cognitive Framework for
Lying

Whether or not to tell a lie in a given situation is often influenced by
a number of variables and judgments. Social scientists have proposed a
number of theoretical frameworks to guide understanding of the cognitive
decision process.332 Though different researchers have emphasized
different elements, most frameworks include the individual’s judgments
of: a) the risks or rewards of being honest versus lying; b) the odds of
avoiding detection; and c) the consequences of getting caught.333
For example, suppose you accidentally bumped the car in front of
yours while parallel parking. You are in a hurry to get to an important
appointment, but you check and see that there is a small dent in the other
car’s bumper. There is also a little rust near it, though, suggesting that it
probably happened a while ago. While you are inspecting the dent, the
owner of the car returns and asks you if there is a problem. At this point
you have to decide whether to lie.
Applying a rational lying-decision framework, you would weigh the
benefits of being honest and admitting you bumped the car (e.g., it will
make you feel good) with the risk of being honest (the other driver may lie
and insist you pay for a repair of a dent you believe you did not actually
cause). You will also consider the benefits of lying (you might make it to
your appointment on time; you will not have to pay for repairs) and the
risks of doing so (if you get caught, it would be embarrassing and could
compound the consequences). You might glance around to see if other
330. Frank Newport, Congress Retains Low Honesty Rating, GALLUP POLL (Dec. 3, 2012).
331. Svenn Lindskold & Pamela S. Walters, Categories for Acceptability of Lies, 120 J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 303, 303–13 (1983).
332. See Walczyk, supra note 305, at 22–36.
333. Id.
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people might have been watching and also consider whether you will be
able to lie convincingly. After processing these variables, you will decide
whether to lie.
This framework presumes that lying is at least a quasi-rational
process. This decision process obviously increases cognitive and
emotional load and takes time. Sometimes, though, the decision to lie is
made under time pressure or other stresses. Dual-processing theory
proposes that deciding whether to lie is not always a quasi-rational
process. Particularly in higher stress situations, people may skip the slow
and systematic central cognitive processing approach and opt instead for
a peripheral route that uses shortcuts like heuristics.334 In the example, you
might quickly make a “satisficing” judgment—a heuristic that focuses on
a speedy evaluation of a few key details and judgments for a good-enough
decision.335 This judgment could go either way: you could focus on your
self-concept as someone with integrity and decide to be honest or you
could focus on your judgment that you caused no harm and lie—”Oh, just
making sure I left you enough space to get out!”
ii.

Some Specific Variables that Can Affect the Decision to Lie

Whether an individual uses a quasi-rational approach or a short cut,
there are some known variables that influence the likelihood of lying in a
particular situation. Substance use, fatigue, and social influences can affect
the chances that people will lie, although not in a consistent manner. For
example, use of alcohol and other psychoactive drugs that impair
judgment, reduce inhibitions and increase risk-taking, or amplify
grandiosity or a sense of entitlement can increase willingness to lie by
decreasing fear of consequences for lying—or they can decrease the
likelihood by reducing fear of negative consequences for telling the
truth.336 Similarly, internal conditions like fatigue, substance-induced
lethargy, pain, or illness can reduce the ability to resist the temptation to
lie via a phenomenon known as ego depletion.337 Alternatively, lying can
be less likely under ego depletion if the individual’s energy reserves are
too depleted to fabricate a believable falsehood.338 Fatigue is a particularly
334. Richard E. Petty & J. T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, 19
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 123, 123–205 (1986).
335. Peter M. Todd & G. F. Miller, From Pride and Prejudice to Persuasion: Satisficing in Mate
Search in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 287–308 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd
eds., 1999).
336. Kristina Suchotzki et al., In Vino Veritas? Alcohol, Response Inhibition and Lying, 50
ALCOHOL 74, 74–81 (2015).
337. Nicole L. Mead et al., Too Tired to Tell the Truth: Self Control Resource Depletion and
Dishonesty, J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 594, 594–97 (2009).
338. Id.
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important variable to consider for the excited utterance exception because
it is a common condition as the body starts to shift from the fight-or-flight
response back to resting function.
Similarly, social contagion refers to a tendency of the behavior of
others in the vicinity to influence one’s own behavior. Lying appears to
spread easily, especially if others appear to be benefitting as a result of
lying or at least failing to be punished for it and if the lies are small or
justifiable.339 On the other hand, being surrounded by people behaving
honestly seems to inhibit the willingness to lie or cheat.340
As well as having a bit of Pinocchio in us, we typically have a lot of
Jiminy Cricket in us too. Most people are mostly honest most of the time—
especially about matters of consequence.341 The impulse to be honest is
likely genetically ingrained, the result of an evolutionary advantage for
those who could maintain a trusting social compact that allowed groups to
live harmoniously.342 Explicit childhood training and the resulting
pride/integrity and guilt/shame emotional systems serve to reinforce the
inborn moral bent, even in the absence of specific rewards and
punishments.343 Ironically, this tendency for honesty to be not just the best,
but the most frequent, policy likely contributes to the typical person’s
difficult in detecting lies; we expect people to be truthful because mostly
they are.
Internal moral compass notwithstanding, when temptation threatens
to override an individual’s better angels, external reminders of
consequences can affect the probability of honest behavior. Reminders
that others are monitoring and/or that dishonesty will incur severe
penalties make truthful statements more likely.344 Interestingly, reminders
to behave with integrity, like requiring individuals to sign their names or
raise their hands to affirm that their answers are truthful, or notices
requesting that people behave honestly, can increase the likelihood of
honesty to levels comparable to those achieved through warnings, threats,

339. Francisco Gino et al., Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: The Effect of
One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393, 393–98 (2009).
340. David Pascual-Ezama et al., Peer Effects in Unethical Behavior: Standing or Reputation?,
10 PLOS ONE (2015).
341. Kim B. Serota et al., The Prevalence of Lying in America: Three Studies of Self-Reported
Lies, 36 HUM. COMM. RES. 2, 2–25 (2010).
342. E. Somanathan & Paul H. Rubin, The Evolution of Honesty, 54 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1,
1–17 (2004).
343. CHARLES S. CARVER & MICHAEL F. SCHEIER, ON THE SELF-REGULATION OF BEHAVIOR
ch. 2 (1998).
344. Uri Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 384–94
(2005).
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and surveillance.345 The timing of the reminders and appeals matters, with
those just prior to performance generally being more effective.346
The implications of these findings for the excited utterance are that
the conditions associated with live testimony, like promising to tell the
truth, visible and auditory reminders of the consequences for perjury, and
courtroom symbols of moral obligation like Lady Justice and the Bible,
are likely to increase honesty—suggesting again that hearsay exemptions
do sacrifice meaningful protections.
d.

Startling Events and Excited Lies

Even if individuals are typically able to lie easily and frequently
under low to moderate stress, that does not necessarily indicate that they
will be able to do so in highly challenging circumstances, or that they will
be able to do so well enough that others will not readily detect their lies.
Accordingly, this section will look at the ability of people to lie following
a startling event and draw on evidence from a range of sources, including
laboratory experiments, parallels with other challenging tasks performed
in startling situations, and a theoretical model of lying under stress and
surprise.
i.

From Cain to “Alternative Facts”

History abounds with Big Lies, told to get something, save face, or
save someone’s skin. “Abel? Haven’t seen him.” “We have a nice big
wooden horse for you as a gift!” “I am not a crook!” “I did not have sex
with that woman!” “I have never had a single positive doping test, and I
do not take performance-enhancing drugs.” “You’re saying it’s a
falsehood. And…[he] gave alternative facts.”
This list could go on and on. But most of these lies, though high
stakes and told under stress, do not actually quite fit the excited utterance
definition because the liar had a hiatus between the shock of discovery and
the time to speak, time to get composed and dream up a fabrication. It is
the added demand of telling a lie spontaneously in the wake of a startling
moment that might make some lies extra tough—perhaps too tough.
And yet…Ryan Lochte arrives at the Olympic Village in the early
morning with a story about being robbed at gunpoint.347 Killers dial 911 to
345. Deepak Malhotra, (When) are Religious People Nicer? Religious Salience and the ‘Sunday
Effect’ on Pro-Social Behavior, JUDGMENT & DECISION-MAKING 138, 138–43 (2010).
346. Lisa Shu et al., Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest
Self-Reports in Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15197,
15197–200 (2012).
347. Melissa Chan, How Ryan Lochte’s Rio Robbery Story Fell Apart, TIME ONLINE (Aug. 18,
2016), http://time.com/4458405/ryan-lochte-rio-robbery-olympics/ [https://perma.cc/YF6W-YSRW].
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report stumbling on homicides or accidents they actually committed.348 A
teenager can’t imagine how that bag of pot ended up under his mattress.
When the police pull her over for weaving along the street on her way
home from a party, your neighbor insists she only had one glass of wine.
Though these kinds of lies have received startlingly little attention
from the scientific community, there is nonetheless plenty of anecdotal
evidence that people do tell them. So how do they manage?
ii.

Lying and Stress in the Laboratory

Laboratory research provides some support for Wigmore’s belief that
lying does indeed require more brain structures and energy. Experiments
show that: a) it often takes longer to formulate a lie than to tell the truth;
b) lying is a more complicated cognitive task than telling the truth; and c)
stress makes it even more difficult to lie.
Laboratory experiments using precise measurement of response
latency (how long it takes to start to answer) and functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) mostly find that lying is in general a slower
task than being honest. For example, when subjects are instructed to lie in
some circumstances and be truthful in others, it takes longer to answer
when subjects have to lie.349 Similar studies with fMRIs have shown that
lying requires activation of more and different parts of the brain than truth
telling.350 Lying involves first activating the areas involved in telling the
truth—but is followed by additional areas, as the liar carries out the
additional cognitive components of lying, including deciding whether to
lie, inhibiting speaking the truth, and creating a fiction.351 Most of the
research agrees that lying puts significant demands on the deceiving
individual’s working memory and executive functions—cognitive
functions that are overtaxed when there is a startling event.352
Laboratory studies show that the addition of moderate stress
increases a liar’s working memory and cognitive load, making it even
more difficult to lie. When subjects are directed to tell lies while or
immediately after being stressed psychologically (such as by performing
348. Mary B. Burns & Kevin C. Moffitt, Automated Deception Detection of 911 Call
Transcripts, 3 SEC. INFORMATICS 6–9 (2014).
349. Jeffery J. Walczyk et al., Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Lying to Questions: Response
Time as a Cue to Deception, 17 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 755, 755–74 (2003).
350. Giorgi Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI
Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 830–36 (2003).
351. See, e.g., Emma J. Williams et al., Telling Lies: The Irrepressible Truth?, 8 PLOS ONE
(2013).
352. Ganis et al., supra note 350, at 830–36; Matthias Gamer, Detecting of Deception and
Concealed Information Using Neuroimaging Techniques, in MEMORY DETECTION: THEORY AND
APPLICATION OF THE CONCEALED INFORMATION TEST 90–113 (Bruno Verschuere et al. eds., 2011).
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difficult math problems) or physically (such as by holding their hands in
ice water), their performance degrades as their cognitive load is increased
(such as by manipulating consequences for quality of performance,
increasing the time or severity of physical stress, increasing the number of
choices, requiring more complex discriminations about when to lie or tell
the truth, or increasing time pressure).353 With greater cognitive load,
subjects make more errors (like lying under the wrong conditions, offering
a different lie from what they were instructed to, or leaking the truth) or
take longer to begin speaking.354 With greater load, subjects also often
simplified their responses, offering fewer details and shorter
verbalizations with simpler vocabulary and less complex grammar.355
In the end, though, these experiments provide at best weak support
for Wigmore’s theory. First, even under stress, subjects were still able to
lie, even if it took them longer. Second, the time difference between telling
the truth and a lie, while statistically significant, would be meaningless in
real world conditions: in these studies, the time variations between true
statements and lies are typically measured in thousandths of a second.356
Discrepancies this brief go unnoticed by casual observers.357 In addition,
differences in latency are relative within individuals; no universal latency
indicates that a speaker is lying.
These studies do confirm that lying is typically a more cognitively
challenging task than telling the truth. In addition, because they involved
simple falsehoods (like lying about the color of a card) under moderate
stress, they leave unanswered questions about real world, high-stakes lies
during actual startling events.
iii. Challenging Task Performance Under Startling Events
Pilots land suddenly disabled jetliners safely; surgical teams perform
complicated surgeries under time pressure after something major
unexpectedly goes very, very wrong; military teams carry out life-or-death
missions in situations clouded with uncertainty and pocked with
unplanned mishaps. Even completely ordinary people perform remarkable
353. See Williams et al., supra note 351; Anna E. van’t Veer et al., Limited Capacity to Lie:
Cognitive Load Interferes with Being Dishonest, 9 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 199, 199–206
(2014).
354. Williams et al., supra note 351.
355. van’t Veer et al., supra note 353; Judee K. Burgoon & Tiantian Qin, The Dynamic Nature
of Deceptive Verbal Communication, 25 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 76 (2006).
356. Bruno Verschuere & Jan De Houwer, Detecting Concealed Information in Less Than a
Second: Response Latency-Based Measures, in MEMORY DETECTION: THEORY AND APPLICATION OF
THE CONCEALED INFORMATION TEST 46–62 (Bruno Verschuere et al. eds., 2011).
357. It is important to note, however, that the types of lies examined in these studies are minor
ones (such as lying about the number on a playing card) and that the consequences for lying or telling
the truth are small.
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feats when surprised and stressed: they improvise equipment and try
strategy after strategy to save others’ lives under difficult physical
conditions—like Joseph Kolanchick358 and thousands of other Carnegie
Medal winners have done.359 Clearly, people are capable of performing
highly complex tasks after being startled and faced with high-stakes peril.
But can they lie under those conditions?
Although studies of stress and stress simulations cannot directly
indicate lying capacity, these studies offer insights on individual coping
methods. To cope with startling events, individuals use: anticipation and
preparation; rehearsal or practice of similar behaviors; reliance on habitual
or recent behaviors, minimization of choices; and use of heuristics and
other shortcuts.360 Many of these processes are ones that are used (though
perhaps in less sophisticated or systematic ways) by ordinary liars.
Anticipating situations where lying might be demanded makes later
performance of lying easier in a couple ways. First, anticipation reduces
surprise, which in turn reduces the emotional load. This facilitating
mechanism is supported experimentally; research subjects who are warned
that they will later need to lie generate lies faster and tell more elaborate
ones than others who are prompted to lie at the last minute.361 Second,
anticipation may enable a liar to prepare by fabricating a lie under lower
cognitive load and even to rehearse lying and make subsequent
adjustments to content or delivery. In one laboratory experiment, both
instruction to try to lie faster and training on how to lie quickly improved
response time for lying, relative to a control group.362 The training group
also improved their performance on lying correctly (i.e., lying under the
target condition and not lying under non-target conditions).363 In another
experiment, liars who had opportunities to prepare and practice their lies
were less likely to be detected.364

358.
Joseph
Kolanchick,
CARNEGIE
HERO
FUND
COMMISSION,
http://www.carnegiehero.org/joseph-kolanchick/ [https://perma.cc/Y286-4LMC].
359. See generally Carnegie Hero Fund Commission Recognizes 19 for Acts of Extraordinary
Civilian Heroism, CARNEGIE HERO FUND COMMISSION, http://www.carnegiehero.org/awardees/
[https://perma.cc/93DG-PQGU].
360. R. Key Dismukes et al., Appendix A: Selective Review of Stress Literature, in R. KEY
DISMUKES, TIMOTHY E. GOLDSMITH & JANEEN A. KOCHAN, EFFECTS OF ACUTE STRESS ON AIRCREW
PERFORMANCE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL ASPECTS, NASA/TM-2015218930 A1-A-39 (2013).
361. Jeffrey J. Walczyk et al., Cognitive Lie Detection: Response Time and Consistency of
Answers as Cues to Deception, 24 J. BUS. PSYCHOL. 33, 33–49 (2009).
362. Xiaoqing Hu et al., A Repeated Lie Becomes a Truth? The Effect of Intentional Control and
Training on Deception, 3 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL., Nov. 12, 2012, at 1, 1.
363. Id.
364. G.R. Miller et al., Self-Monitoring, Rehearsal, and Deceptive Communication, 10 HUM.
COMM. RES. 97, 97–117 (1983).
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People often mentally prepare and rehearse lies for commonly
encountered situations where lying may be advantageous (e.g., “The dog
ate my homework!” “Your new haircut looks great!”); it is likely that
people who are risk-takers prepare, and may even practice, for lying in
high-stake, high arousal situations (e.g., “I swear I only had one drink,
Officer,” or “Honey, I just happened to run into my old girlfriend and she
asked me to have a drink; it wasn’t anything more than that.”).
Strategies that minimize choices also make it easier to lie in
demanding circumstances. Keeping the lie close to the actual truth and
only changing a key variable is a common strategy. Liars can also stick to
easily-accessed content in their memories, for example, by repeating a
recent lie or a successful lie.365 People can also avoid the need to fabricate
content by “borrowing” their lies, like using stories they have encountered
from others or through media; individuals with extensive and frequently
used “story banks” may be able to retrieve appropriate long-term
memories relatively easily. In addition, most people have heuristic,
multipurpose “autolies” –like “Not my fault!” or “No, I didn’t!”
Finally, there is evidence that lying is not invariably a more
challenging cognitive task than telling the truth. For example, when the
truth is complex or fuzzy, when the speaker is highly motivated to be
accurate and thorough, when it is necessary to adjust the communication
for a given listener, or when the speaker has mixed feelings about being
truthful versus lying, deciding to be honest can create greater cognitive
load than simply telling a short and simple lie.
iv.

The Goldilocks Theory: People Lie After a Startling Event When
it’s the Just-Right—or Good-Enough—Option

If instead of escaping out the window, Goldilocks had been cornered
by the trio of talking carnivores who startled her awake, there is a good
chance she would have resorted to lying to protect herself. “Look over
there! It’s the Wicked Witch!” “I’m so sorry! I thought this was my
granny’s house!” “You don’t want to eat me! I have mad cow (bear?)
disease and you’ll get infected if you have even one bite!”
According to the social-cognitive framework used to predict a
decision to lie discussed above,366 deciding to lie would be a rational
choice for someone in a high threat situation like this one with few better
defensive options. Goldilocks would have multiple motivations to lie—to
protect herself from getting eaten, being punished by her parents, or going
to juvenile court. The chances of getting caught lying are likely low—
365. Judee K. Burgoon, When is Deceptive Message Production More Effortful than TruthTelling? A Baker’s Dozen of Moderators, 6 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL., Dec. 24, 2015, at 1, 5 (2015).
366. Walcyzk, supra note 305.
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mostly people get away with lies.367 And in any event, she has little to
lose—if she does not lie, she probably gets eaten, if she does lie, maybe
she escapes. And finally, we can feel confident that a junior burglar and
vandal like her has the ability to lie well within her wheelhouse. Fibbing
will probably be one of the first options that comes to mind once she is
confronted.
More likely, though, Goldilocks will decide to lie in this situation
without even going through a rational analysis. The dual processing model
suggests that this situation—high-stakes, time-pressured, and trapped—is
one where the decision to lie—and the decision about which lie to tell—
will occur more or less automatically without thorough consideration of
alternatives or longer term consequences. Instead, heuristics will come to
the rescue. Common lies used in no-time-to-think-must-act scenarios
include “distract” (the Wicked Witch option), “deny wrongdoing” (the
granny’s cottage option) and “imitate success” (the mad cow option).
In the end, Goldilocks’s choice may prove to be less than optimal,
but that would not be surprising either. Because in these conditions, people
make mistakes. And that brings us to the next, and more likely, source of
error in excited utterances.
2.

Mistakes

In 1981, Jerry Parr, President Reagan’s Special Agent in Charge, was
on duty during the assassination attempt.368 Shots rang out at close range
as Reagan and his entourage left the venue where the president had been
speaking—a clear startling event for everyone present.369 Parr shoved the
president into the waiting limousine and scrambled in after him, directing
the driver to go.370 Shortly after departing the scene, Parr made a statement
that could obviously be classifiable as an excited utterance: “Rawhide
[Reagan] is okay!” and directed the limousine to return to the White
House.371

367. Arcimowicz et al., supra note 316.
368. Marc Ambinder, Full Secret Service Transcript: The Moment Reagan Was Shot, ATLANTIC
(March 11, 2011) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/03/full-secret-service-transcriptthe-moment-reagan-was-shot/72343/ [https://perma.cc/YL4E-CVEY]. For video footage of the
assassination attempt, see Jessica McBride, WATCH: Reagan Assassination Attempt Videos, HEAVY
(July 27, 2016, 12:22pm), http://heavy.com/news/2016/07/reagan-assassination-attempt-video-newscoverage-live-photos-watch-uncensored-hinckley-ronald/ [https://perma.cc/UBN2WPHU]. Note that
all three major networks incorrectly reported that Press Secretary Brady died in the attack—another
error (likely via excited utterances from their reporters on the scene).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
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His utterance was not a lie—but it was completely wrong. Reagan
was not okay.372 No one, including Reagan, realized he had been shot.373
After a few moments, it became obvious that Reagan had some injuries—
sore ribs and bleeding from his mouth—but it took longer before anyone
in the limo realized that Reagan’s injuries were not minor—that the
discomfort he was experiencing in his side was not caused by being shoved
into the vehicle, and that the blood coming from his mouth was not from
a cut lip, but that both were caused by a bullet hitting the president’s rib
and puncturing his lung.374
Imagine if John Hinckley, Jr.’s attorney had been able to introduce
this statement as evidence that his client did not harm the president, that
his injuries must have been incurred subsequently to his client’s actions?
Though Wigmore’s theory focused on lying as the behavior likely to
make an utterance unreliable, as the example above demonstrates, there
are other ways an excited utterance can be untrue: through mistakes in
perception and cognition. The fact-finder’s lack of opportunity to assess
the witness’s accuracy—through cross-examination and observation of the
witness’s demeanor—is another significant problem with the excited
utterance exception. This section will show how high stress can increase
the likelihood of misperception in ways that affect the reliability of excited
utterances and countenance against admitting them into evidence.
Just as characteristics of combat situations like noise and other
intense stimuli can produce “fog of war” confusion,375 comparable
conditions in more mundane startling events lead to misinterpretations of
reality. The misstatements about what happened that occur in these
confusing situations are not lies—they are not told with the intent to
mislead—but they are just as untrustworthy and unlikely to advance
justice in a courtroom as deliberate deception.
Most perceptual errors happen automatically, outside of conscious
awareness or control. They tend to be experienced as “real” and not as an
effort to adjust reality, and they often persist or, frequently, become
compounded, over time.376
372. Id.; Howell Raines, Reagan Wounded In Chest By Gunman; Outlook ‘Good’ After 2-Hour
Surgery; Aide And 2 Guards Shot; Suspect Held, N.Y. TIMES (March 30, 1981),
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0330.html#article [https://perma.cc/UV4P7FE7].
373. Id.
374. Jerry S. Parr, ‘Lord, Let Him Live,’ Reagan’s Secret Service Agent Prayed, USA TODAY,
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2011-03-30-secret-service-agent-reaganshot_N.htm [https://perma.cc/ZJ4V-VTZN].
375. H.R. Lieberman et al., The Fog of War: Documenting Cognitive Decrements Associated
with the Stress of Combat, PROCEEDINGS 23RD ARMY SCIENCE CONFERENCE (Dec. 2002).
376. See T.D. Wilson & N. Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted
Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 16 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1994); S.A. Hawkins. & R.
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Certain perceptual and cognitive processes are particularly likely to
be sources of error during startling events because of their tendencies to
be used as shortcuts for decision-making under time pressure and high
cognitive load.377 Some of the more common perceptual errors are:
1.
Closure. Humans’ brains are pre-programmed to “fill in
the blanks” when information is missing.378 If, for example,
observers’ views were obscured or competing noise made them
unable to hear something clearly, their brains will automatically,
and often out of conscious awareness, fill in the missing
information.
2.
Stereotyping, Priming, Halo Effects, and Other
Expectation Biases. These are universal heuristic errors that lead
people to “see” what they expect or perhaps hope to see.
Stereotyping refers to automatic judgments of certain groups or
situations; they can be favorable or unfavorable and can powerfully
bias perception.379 The Trayvon Martin shooting highlighted
common stereotypes about young black men—and showed how
those stereotypes could influence perception; George Zimmerman
was sure he “saw” a gun in Martin’s hand, but it was a bag of
Skittles.380 Priming refers to the tendency of recent experiences
(direct or vicarious) to influence near-future interpretations.381 Halo
effects are similar to stereotyping, but are attached to a particular
individual rather than a group, in that one’s global evaluation of
someone can influence how other actions by that same individual

Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 311 (1990).
377. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 251; K. Mogg et al., Attentional Bias to Threat: Roles of
Trait Anxiety, Stressful Events, and Awareness, 47 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 841 (1994).
378. Arie W. Kruglanski & Donna Webster, Motivated Closing of the Mind: “Seizing” and
“Freezing”, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 264 (1996).
379. Mahzarin R. Banaji, Social Psychology of Stereotypes, in N. SMELSER & P. BALTES,
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 15101–04 (1st ed.
2001).
380. Melanie Tannenbaum, Trayvon Martin’s Psychological Killer: Why We See Guns That
Aren’t There, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Mar. 26, 2012), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guestblog/trayvon-martins-psychological-killer-why-we-see-guns-that-arent-there/#
[https://perma.cc/
Q4V5-NL7J].
381. John A. Bargh, Mark Chen, & Lara Burrows, Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct
Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.,
Mar. 3, 1996, at 230, 230–44. But see Ulrich Schimmack et al., Reconstruction of a Train Wreck: How
Priming Research Went off the Rails, REPLICABILITY INDEX (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://replicationindex.wordpress.com/2017/02/02/reconstruction-of-a-train-wreck-how-primingresearch-went-of-the-rails/ [https://perma.cc/LR58-LNXA] (commenting on flaws in the research).
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are perceived.382 Finally, people may have come to expect an event
to play out a certain way or others to react in a particular fashion as
a result of prior experiences or training; these expectations affect
what they notice or how they interpret contrary information.
3.
Perceptual Tunneling, Weapon Focus, and Other
Attentional Biases. Alterations in attention during the fight-or-flight
response affect what sensory information is detected, given weight,
and remembered even moments later.383 Perceptual tunneling may
stem from visual tunneling (when a visual field is limited to a
narrow area of concern), resulting in an inability to describe
anything beyond that field because one simply never even noticed
it, or it may be the result of what one decides to concentrate on.384
4.
Knowledge Biases. Knowledge relevant to a particular
event can contribute dramatically to what is noticed or missed, and
how the information is interpreted. Footage of family members and
school children watching the tragic launch of the Challenger space
shuttle reveals this phenomenon vividly.385 Those with less
knowledge about normal shuttle launches appear unconcerned or
mildly confused when there is a small explosion and smoke appears
as the shuttle ascends and reaches another stage.386 The faces of
NASA workers and others with more experience, though, show
they instantly understand that tragedy has occurred.387 Another
common knowledge bias occurs with recognition of faces of people
whose racial background differs from the viewer’s; most people are
less able to describe or remember facial features, hairstyle details,
and other characteristics of people from a race not their own.388
5.
Attribution Error. Attribution error refers to the near
universal tendency to place blame for others’ poor behavior on their
own internal characteristics and intentions, while tending to see

382. See Sean N. Talamus, Blinded by Beauty: Attractiveness Bias and Accurate Perceptions of
Academic Performance, PLOS ONE 1–18 (Feb. 17, 2016).
383. See Lisette J. Schmidt et al., The Time Course of Attentional Bias to Cues of Threat and
Safety, 31 COGNITION & EMOTION 845, 845–57 (2017).
384. Dismukes et al., supra note 360, at A-7.
385. To view the video footage, see davidwrightatloppers, Challenger Shuttle Disaster – Raw
Uncut Footage, YOUTUBE (Aug. 20, 2009), www.youtube.com/watch?v=vd7dxmBLg48.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Siegried L. Sporer & Ruth Horry, Recognizing Faces of Other Ethnic Groups: An
Integration of Theories, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 36, 36–97 (2001).
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external events or circumstances as largely responsible for one’s
own missteps.389
6.
Cognitive Dissonance. Cognitive dissonance happens
when what one believes is at odds with what one perceives (or
does). This creates an uncomfortable state that the mind corrects by
either changing beliefs or by deciding one’s perception is wrong.
Because belief and attitude changes are generally complex and
lengthy processes occurring after many contrary experiences,
disbelieving the correctness of one’s perception is the more likely
response to this kind of discrepancy.390
7.
Cognitive Models. Cognitive or mental models are
acquired global mindsets about complex situations that are used to
guide expectations, judgments, and decisions while a situation
unfolds. In some cases, these models may cause exaggerated or
false perceptions of threats, even triggering or amplifying fight-orflight reactions unnecessarily.391 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,
for example, often involves the operation of cognitive models about
potentially threatening situations or stimuli.392 Likewise, possessing
a weapon can create a cognitive model that leads to the perception
of danger and the assumption that others’ intents are threatening.393
8.
Anchoring. The order in which information is presented
affects the likelihood that it will be attended to, remembered, or
interpreted as important. In general, information at the beginning
and end of an event will act as anchors, and be remembered as more
significant than information in the middle.394
Obviously, these kinds of perceptual errors can affect all participants
and witnesses to an event. The reason that they are important for the
excited utterance exception is two fold. First, many kinds of perceptual
389. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and his Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution
Process, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (VOL. 10) 173, 184 (L.
Berkowitz Ed., 1977).
390.
Saul
McLeod,
Cognitive
Dissonance,
SIMPLY
PSYCHOL.
(2014),
www.simplypsychology.org/cognitive-dissonance.html [https://perma.cc/5B98-53ST].
391. Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Mental Models and Human Reasoning, 107 PNAS 18243, 18244
(2010); David A. Clark & Aaron T. Beck, COGNITIVE THERAPY OF ANXIETY DISORDERS: SCIENCE
AND PRACTICE 32–51 (2011).
392. Richard Meiser-Stedman et al., Maladaptive Cognitive Appraisals Mediate the Evolution
of Posttraumatic Stress Reactions: A 6-Month Follow-Up of Child and Adolescent Assault and Motor
Vehicle Accident Survivors, 118 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 778, 778–87 (2009).
393. Adam Biggs et al., Armed and Attentive: Holding a Weapon Can Bias Attentional Priorities
in Scene Viewing, 75 ATTENTION PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 1715, 1715–24 (2013).
394. Dismukes et al., supra note 360, at A-20.
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errors are more likely in the “startling” situations that invoke the exception
than in other calmer situations. Thus, the frailties of eyewitness
perceptions are exacerbated under the excited state that is the premise of
the excited utterance exception. Second, the excited utterance exception
admits out-of-court statements without the normal safeguards of the trial
process—cross-examination and the opportunity for the fact finder to
observe the witness. These safeguards protect against not only deliberately
deceptive testimony, but also well-intentioned but inaccurate testimony.
3.

Miscommunications

Finally, the subtler “utterance” component of the excited utterance
exception is often overlooked in discussions of whether excited utterances
are sufficiently reliable to be automatically admitted in court. Startling
events may not only affect a declarant’s ability to deceive or the accuracy
of their perceptions but could also interfere with the communication of an
utterance.
In terms of communication, there are two primary sources of error:
the declarant and the recipient. There has been relatively little research on
how acute stress affects spontaneous communications, but this section will
examine some of the issues around the ability of a surprised and stressed
declarant to frame and express an utterance. It will also present findings
of a preliminary exploration of excited utterances in natural situations
captured on video and offer suggestions for future research. Second, it will
examine factors that could affect the recipient’s ability to absorb,
remember, and later repeat the utterance accurately. The role of the
receiver (who will later pass along the utterance) has been particularly
ignored as a possible source of additional and unique error in excited
utterances.
a.

Speaker Issues

Even if an individual has been sufficiently startled by a stressful
event such that the individual is unable to lie, and even if that individual
was able to accurately perceive the event despite the stress, the individual
may or may not be able to communicate adequately. Oral communication
imposes additional and unique cognitive load, activating additional areas
of the brain and requiring coordination with other cognitive tasks.
To utter a coherent, reality-anchored statement, the individual’s
sensory impressions must be encoded into language, “packaged” to match
vocabulary and syntax to the needs and abilities of the intended target, and
delivered. All while so emotionally overwrought as to be unable to
fabricate.
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Research on communication under high levels of stress is fairly
limited. There is evidence, though, that speech production is affected by
high levels of emotion.395 The length of utterances tends to be shorter, and
the structure and vocabulary less complex.396 Studies of teamwork in crisis
situations, like in aviation accidents, show that speaker communication
errors are common and varied, affecting the timeliness of
communications, the completeness and adequacy of communications, the
reading of nonverbal cues, as well as any errors caused by failure to
communicate when needed.397 Research pays even less attention to the
semantic content of what people verbalize or to the temporal aspects of
utterances. But at a minimum, given the effects on vocabulary and
sentence complexity, it is reasonable to assume that utterances will be less
detailed and less precise or nuanced.
Because of the paucity of formal evidence, this section will include
some tentative and preliminary suggestions of how speech content and
timing are affected by real life startling events. These suggestions are
based on an anecdotal review of dozens of traumatic events and
emergencies captured on videotape and retrieved from YouTube, as well
as review of 911 calls from events like the Pulse nightclub attack in
Orlando. Examined footage includes well known incidents, such as the
assassination attempt on President Reagan in 1981, the Challenger
explosion in 1986, the 9/11 terror attack in 2001, the 2013 Boston
Marathon bombing, and the 2016 Bastille Day truck attack in Nice,
France, all of which involved multiple victims and multiple witnesses and
most of which were captured on video from multiple vantage points. Also
examined were: dash- and bodycam videos; bystander or participant
cellphone videos from several notorious police shooting incidents, such as
the Philando Castile shooting in Minnesota, the Samuel DuBose shooting
in Ohio, and the Keith Lamont Scott shooting in North Carolina; and
amateur video of multiple airshow and auto race accidents.398 These were
“balanced” with assorted home videos of trampoline accidents and other
backyard stunts gone wrong.399
395. See generally Tony W. Buchanan et al., Acute Stress Reduces Speech Fluency, 97
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 60, 60–66 (2014).
396. Laura R. Saslow et al., Speaking Under Pressure: Low Linguistic Complexity is Linked to
High Physiological and Emotional Stress Reactivity, 51 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 257
(2014), http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~keltner/publications/Saslow2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3FKU4KM].
397. Dismukes et al., supra note 360.
398. For space reasons, all the reviewed videos are not linked here. Footage from these incidents
is widely available on YouTube, though, including videos shot by amateurs, professional media, and
authorities.
399. Because of difficulty in locating examples, this analysis did not include many types of
startling incidents that might unfold differently, like typical traffic accidents, industrial accidents, etc.
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This examination suggests that there are some typical patterns of
vocalized responses to startling events, though utterances are affected by
variables like magnitude of the event, the role of the speaker in the event,
the length and pace in which the event unfolds, the degree of surprise, and
the speaker’s distance, physically, emotionally, and temporally, from the
“action.”
The first seconds after the realization of a crisis often precluded true
speech, particularly by those most directly affected or nearest the action.
Frequently, the first vocalization was not speech, but a sharp intake of
breath. This sort of response was often followed by apparently stunned
silence or nonverbal vocalizations like cries and screams, gasps, grunts,
occasional simple one-word exclamations like “Oh!” or “No!” In the most
extreme events and among those most directly affected, these nonverbal
vocalizations continued for the duration of the event and even beyond, as
if the event had not only stilled reflective capacities but robbed those
involved of speech altogether.
After more time or with greater distance, vocalizations still were
typically not speech so much as general exclamations—“Oh no!” “Good
lord!” “Oh my God!” or swearing. Particularly when the situation involved
a young male being filmed doing stupid things in the backyard, there might
be inappropriate laughter. If the threat was uncertain and the bystander
was at a safe distance, there were sometimes more narrative utterances,
though typically these were short, simple statements or questions, couched
with uncertainty: “That doesn’t look good,” or “Is that supposed to
happen?” In other cases though, early utterances often included short
warnings and commands—“Run!” “Help!” “He’s got a gun!” “Call 911!”
For events where a lead-up to the incident occurred and was
captured, there were sometimes threats, warnings, or requests by
participants and bystanders before the peak of the incident—e.g., “Put the
gun down!” “Don’t shoot!” “He won’t hurt you!” etc. Overall, the
emotional tenor of statements by both victims and witnesses was negative
and consistent with the kinds of emotion evoked by the fight-or-flight
response—with fear predominating and anger second, unless the speaker
was obviously confused or uncertain about the nature of the incident.
Transcripts of calls made to 911 during the 2016 Pulse nightclub
terrorist attack in Orlando, Florida, showcased some interesting features
of communications in the midst of a drawn-out extreme event.400 First,
It is also important to bear in mind that many videos do not start until after the incident is well under
way, and vary in quality. The results presented here should be considered as informal and preliminary,
as suggestions for further research rather than conclusive findings.
400. To view the transcripts for the 911 calls, see Transcript (June 12, 2016, 2:03am) (pp. 1–68),
http://www.cityoforlando.net/cityclerk/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/06/911transcriptspgs1-
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action preceded communication; callers did not dial 911 until they got to
a safe place.401 Second, the content and quality of their communications
appeared impaired by the stress and confusion.402 Callers were often
unable to provide even fairly basic information they likely once knew
(such as the name or location of the club).403 In addition, their
communications were typically disjointed and disorganized, with critical
facts omitted or presented in a confusing order; dispatchers typically had
to ask clarifying questions.404 Characteristics of the situation also affected
the quality of their utterances; for example, callers who voiced fear of
being located by the shooter whispered, impairing the dispatchers’ ability
to hear, and used short, choppy utterances.405 Higher levels of
physiological stress also impaired communication ability; individuals who
had been shot or otherwise injured often had to hand the phone to someone
else.406
In summary, this anecdotal review suggests that the variables that
influence ability to deceive or likelihood of mistakes also affect the quality
and content of utterances related to the event.
b.

Recipient Issues

The recipient’s task is also complex and may be affected by the
degree to which the recipient was also directly exposed to the startling
event or was vicariously “infected” by transmitted stress. The recipient has
to absorb a message transmitted by someone experiencing high stress (and
likely speaking in the disorganized and choppy manner that stress
induces), often still in a distracting environment that makes it hard to hear
clearly. The recipient likely has to split attention between expressing
concern for the speaker and accurately receiving the message while
simultaneously suppressing distractions in the environment. The recipient
must then hold the message in short-term memory along with possible
additional new concerns resulting from the incident before transferring the
message to long-term memory, while also avoiding contamination of the
message with statements from others and the recipient’s own memories
68_June12.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW6Z-HBNX]; Transcript (June 12, 2016, 2:03am) (pp. 69–107)
http://www.cityoforlando.net/cityclerk/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2016/06/911transcriptspgs69107_June12.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGZ9-K2XF]. To view other public records, such as recordings of
the calls, police body-cam footage, etc. from the shootings, see Pulse Tragedy Public Records, CITY
OF ORLANDO (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.cityoforlando.net/cityclerk/pulse-tragedy-public-records/
[https://perma.cc/J2Y9-95EC].
401. See, e.g., Transcript (June 12, 2016, 2:03am), supra note 400, at 2, l. 22.
402. See, e.g., id. at 14.
403. See, e.g., id. at 18, l. 22, 35, l. 5.
404. See, e.g., id. at 26–30, call #9.
405. See, e.g., id. at 30–32, call #10.
406. See, e.g., id. at 61–65, call #19.
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and emotions. That memory must then be stored in long-term memory
unchanged by the effects of interim retellings and questioning and any
emerging information about the incident, and then finally be retrieved as
a good facsimile of the original message at a later—often much later—
date without incurring significant decay or distortion. Recipients who were
not directly present also have the additional challenge of having to create
and access the memory minus the benefit of sensory and motor cues that
are helpful for accurate encoding, storage, and retrieval.
Imagine playing a game of telephone where the first person
experiences a major trauma, passes the message to the next person within
the next half hour, more or less, and then that person passes it along a year
or two later. It seems probable that that game will result in even less
accurate transmission of the intended message than one that passes
through multiple conduits at a birthday party—with none of the hilarity.
The excited utterance exception does not depend explicitly on
whether the recipient of the utterance believed the declarant (because of
the presumption that the statement must be true). Consideration of whether
the utterance is truthful by the person who passes it along may be an
informal filter that could screen out some false statements that manage to
be uttered despite the relative difficulty of lying under stress, thus
increasing confidence in the trustworthiness of the hearsay exception.
C.

The Excited Utterance Paradox

People utter untrue things under stress all the time. Sometimes they
do so deliberately to deceive, sometimes they do so inadvertently because
of mistakes of perception or communication. Why and how they do so,
though, is largely irrelevant when the ultimate question is whether excited
utterances are so inherently reliable that they need not be subjected to the
usual safeguards of live testimony. And the answer seems to be that
excited utterances do not meet that high standard.
One intriguing thesis that emerged from reviewing the literature is
what might be called the Excited Utterance Paradox: when the levels of
arousal are so high that an individual is unable to tell even a moderately
detailed and plausible lie, his perception is likely so distorted that he makes
mistakes in understanding reality and/or in communicating his
impressions. But when arousal is low enough to facilitate more accurate
perception and effective communication, it is also low enough to reduce
the cognitive load that interferes with fabricating a lie. There may well be
a theoretical sweet spot of arousal where perception is accurate and lietelling is challenging, but that would be a difficult discernment for an
ordinary bystander or judge to detect.
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CONCLUSION
Law is social engineering, according to Roscoe Pound, perhaps the
country’s preeminent legal scholar.407 It is shaped by the social sciences.
Yet peek behind the curtain, and there is very little engineering or science
to be found in many of our laws. The excited utterance exception is a prime
example of a legal doctrine devoid of the rigors of engineering and science.
Courts exclude hearsay based on the general presumption that the
search for truth is improved by bringing witnesses into the courtroom,
placing them under oath, subjecting them to cross-examination, and
providing the fact finder with an opportunity to observe the witnesses’
demeanor. The hearsay exceptions exist for circumstances where an outof-court statement is so likely to be reliable that the justice system is
willing to forego the safeguards attendant with live testimony.
As this Article demonstrates, the scientific evidence, though perhaps
not gap-free or perfect, thoroughly undermines the excited utterance
exception. As conceived by Wigmore over a hundred years ago, the
exception has three elements: (1) there must be a startling occasion; (2)
the out-of-court statement must be made before the declarant has had time
to fabricate; and (3) the declarant’s out-of-court statement must relate to
the circumstances of the startling event. Courts today generally apply tests
that incorporate some version of these three elements.
Psychology does not implicate the third element, and courts can
easily assess the connection between the excited utterance and the startling
event. As for the other two elements, however, psychology tells us both
that those elements provide no assurance of reliability and that neither the
recipient nor the court can accurately assess whether these elements are
satisfied.
The first element requires a “startling occasion.” The analysis of
what constitutes a sufficiently startling condition is not confined to the
nature of the occasion itself. Rather, the analysis depends on a myriad of
additional circumstances, including the declarant’s psychological and
physiological condition at the time of the event, the declarant’s personal
connection to the event, and the declarant’s proximity to the event. Thus,
the startling nature of witnessing an injury during a sporting event might
depend on factors like the witness’s stress level at the time of the incident,
whether the witness has ever played the sport, whether the witness’s child
407. See, e.g., William L. Grossman, The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound, 44 YALE L. J. 605,
608 (1935) (discussing Pound’s “Engineering Theory of law”); Linus McManaman, Social
Engineering: The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound, 33 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 16 (1958) (“Law is
defined as a task of social engineering designed to eliminate friction and waste in the satisfaction of
unlimited human interests and demands out of a limited store of goods in existence. This is
undoubtedly the most important aspect of Pound’s doctrine of law.”).
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or relative was playing in the game, how well the witness was able to see
the injury, etc. Judges have no training or guidance as to how to make
these determinations.
While determining how startling or stressful an event was to an
individual is problematic, expecting judges to accurately apply the second
factor is asking the impossible. There is no scientific support for the
exception’s fundamental premise that a startling event is likely to render a
witness unable to fabricate. Even when excitement freezes fabrication,
there is no scientific evidence explicating the duration of the incapacity to
fabricate. The science does establish, however, that the intensity and
duration of the emotional effects of a startling occasion are idiosyncratic
to the particular declarant at the particular point in time in the context of
the particular event.
Compounding those idiosyncrasies, the court typically must depend
on the perceptions and memory of the recipient of the statement to assess
the emotional state of the declarant. Not only does each declarant express
emotions uniquely, but the typical recipient is not trained or equipped to
accurately assess the emotional state of the declarant. The problem is then
further compounded because the judge must attempt an independent
assessment of the declarant’s emotional state based on, among other
things, the recipient’s assessment, akin to hearsay on hearsay. As this
Article illustrates, all of these determinations are extremely complex and
nuanced. Trained psychologists would be hard pressed to determine the
effects of a particular occasion on a specific declarant based on the
observations of an untrained recipient—asking a judge to make that
determination is simply not reasonable.
Furthermore, to the extent that an occasion is sufficiently startling to
cause the declarant to be unable to lie, the occasion is also likely to
interfere with the declarant’s ability to accurately perceive and describe
the occasion. This paradox countenances in favor of elimination of the
excited utterance altogether. If there is a theoretical “sweet spot” where an
occurrence is sufficiently startling to render an observer unable to fabricate
but not sufficiently startling to interfere with the observer’s ability to
accurately perceive and describe the occurrence, searching for such an
occurrence would be like hunting the questing beast. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that a judge could identify such an occurrence if it presented itself,
even with extensive training.
Certainly, the psychological evidence does not support an exception
to the hearsay rule premised on the idea that the statement of an observer
of a startling occasion is more likely to be reliable than other statements.
Rather, the evidence supports the opposite presumption. It is not feasible
to refine the exception, adding new factors. As the above discussion of the
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science demonstrates, this is an enormously complex issue that is not
reducible to a list of elements that an untrained judge could apply
meaningfully. The excited utterance exception does not advance the search
for the truth in legal proceedings, and it should be abolished.

